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JPRS L/10636

6 JULY 1982

Worldwide Report

TERRORISM

FOUO 5/82



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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WORLDWIDE REPORT

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN TERRORIST LEADER DISCUSSES PLANS, CONTACTS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 12 Feb 82 pp 20-22, 19 Feb 82 p 6

/Article by Zaki Shihab: "A Secret Armenian Army Leader to AL-HAWADITH: We Take Pride in Soviet Armenia but Blame It for Its Negligence toward the Armenian Struggle!"/

/Text/ For more than a month, the date for the meeting with one of the leaders of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia kept shifting from specific appointments on occasions to postponements on other occasions. Between these, the waiting process pervaded the situation. Activity, "as they say," totally dominated the Armenian army, and news about it began to appear in unusual ways. The front pages of the international, Arab and local press brought the reader, wherever he was, the results of some operation or another that members of this army were carrying out, in France, Switzerland or other areas of the world.

One evening last week, AL-HAWADITH was contacted in its office in Beirut by phone and told that its correspondent was to wait, with its photographer Joseph Nakhlah, in the correspondent's home on the chance that someone might knock on the door and take them to one of the centers the Armenian Secret Army has adopted for headquarters. In fact, as 1800 hours approached, the bell rang and the door opened to a fairhaired young man, heavyset and tall, who asked for the names, then proceeded to say "Are you ready?"

The immediate answer was "Of course--where to?"

Our question went unanswered!

/Out front/ was a car whose general appearance was undistinguished, due to the advent of night, which had begun to fall. Three young men were waiting for us in addition to the driver. We got into the car, shook hands with them and introduced ourselves. They asked us to put masks on our heads to cover our eyes, and the car then went off. Where to? We don't know!

After about half an hour, the car stopped in front of a building, we got out and we went into the basement of the house and were taken to a room there.

The young companions apologized for this conduct and said,

"You understand the security measures; the situation demands this of us. We hope the day will come when you will visit us in our liberated republic, Armenia!"

One of them came forth and introduced us to the young Armenian Dimitri Georgiou, whom the French authorities had recently released after a period of imprisonment on the charge of committing a "terrorist" act in France.

Armenian posters had been put up. Pictures of young Armenian men and women carrying out various operations graced the walls of the room, which was 3 meters by 3 meters, and in addition there were collections of brochures, a small tape recorder and plain wooden chairs.

In a few moments a tall young Armenian in his thirties came in, speaking broken non-Lebanese Arabic. He shook hands with us and apologized for the delay in the meeting. His comrades who were with us then introduced him:

"Comrade Hagop Hagopian (an alias), one of the Armenian Army leaders who are spread about over the world."

We began the conversation.

AL-HAWADITH: Why was your organization established?

Hagop Hagopian: The organization of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia was established as a natural response to the state of revolutionary apathy that the Armenian scene, consisting of the dispossessed Armenian masses of the whole world, was suffering from. It also came about as a response to the national and class repression that our people have suffered throughout their time in exile. In order for us to put an end to these two forms of oppression, it was necessary to promote a revolutionary focal point that would assume the revolutionary tasks and historic responsibilities of liberating the Armenian citizen, calling for his rights in exile and preparing him to wage his struggle alongside other struggling peoples. Therefore the central task of the Armenian citizen lies in the process of struggling to liberate his nation Armenia, which has been usurped by the fascist Turkish regime.

AL-HAWADITH: Therefore your goal may be summarized as--

Hagop Hagopian: Liberation of Armenia, which has been occupied by the Turkish regime, and the establishment of a socialist society in liberated Armenia.

AL-HAWADITH: Do you believe that the only means for realizing the goals are sabotage and terror?

Hagop Hagopian: I would like to warn you against repeating what the Western media are circulating. Our methods are not destructive; although our methods are revolutionary, they are called destructive. Since you are an Arab journalist, let me tell you that the methods of the Palestinian revolution are destructive and those

of the Arab struggles in the era of the Ottoman, British and French occupations were also destructive. I would like you to correct your question.

AL-HAWADITH: What is your position on the other Armenian political parties?

Hagop Hagopian: Of course, our position regarding the political parties on the Armenian stage is clear. They are without a doubt traditional parties whose role ended in exile, because they have no programs for this stage of liberation of our occupied territory. Their political program may simply be summarized as preserving "the Armenianness of the Armenians." Therefore we founded the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia as part of a clear program and vision for liberating the occupied land. We have stayed away from these parties because they have grown conventional and have developed relations with the regimes where they are located.

AL-HAWADITH: So there is no coordination among you?

Hagop Hagopian: Absolutely not. Absolutely not.

AL-HAWADITH: It is well known that there is a big Armenian community in the United States. Does it give you support? Are there any ties that bind you to it in spite of your leftist orientation?

Hagop Hagopian: We have relations with our masses everywhere we are located. Leftist--our organization is not what the Western press, which calls it "the international left," claims it is. Rather, it arises from commitment and close adherence to our Armenian masses and defense of their interests and our central cause, be they in the United States of America, Europe or the Middle East. If our adherence to the cause and our demand for our rights is to be labelled "leftism," then we are leftists.

AL-HAWADITH: Where are the Armenians located in the world? What is your population and geographical breakdown?

Hagop Hagopian: The Armenian masses have a concentrated presence in the United States of America, where their number is estimated at about 1 million. This of course puts the Armenian community in the United States in first place in terms of the number of citizens in foreign countries. The Armenian community in Iran is second, that in Europe as a whole third, and then come the Arab countries. This is as far as the community in exile goes, where the approximate number of Armenian citizens is 4 million. There are also about 3 million people in the Soviet Republic of Armenia.

AL-HAWADITH: What are the boundaries of the country you are calling for?

Hagop Hagopian: The boundaries of the country we are calling for are in keeping with those endorsed by the Lausanne and Sevres agreements of 1920; that is, they encompass the following provinces: the Province of Erzerum, the Province of Van, the Province of Bitlis, the Province of Kars, the Province of Ardahan, and Mount Ararat. This map was recognized at the time by the Soviet Union, the United

States, Britain, France, and Turkey itself. However, no party ventured to bring it into being; they proceeded to act in terms of their own interests only, which take pleasure in peoples' problems.

AL-HAWADITH: What is your position on the Republic of Armenia? Do you view it as an embodiment of the national state you dream of?

Hagop Hagopian: We take pride in the Soviet Republic of Armenia, and we take pride in the fact that it has struggled and managed to play a great role in the context of preserving and developing Armenian culture, technology, industry, and so forth. At the same time, all these resources are mobilized to serve other peoples, be they the other republics in the Soviet Union or the Arab peoples and the oppressed peoples in Africa, because when the Soviet Union supports the Palestinian revolution or the Arab countries in any manner, the Republic of Armenia automatically contributes to that support. Here we, as an Armenian secret army for the liberation of Armenia, can record our observation on officials in the Soviet Republic of Armenia, which is that they have abandoned the sons of their country who are struggling for the Armenian people in exile and do not perform their duty toward Armenia's central cause.

AL-HAWADITH: Is that meant as a threat?

Hagop Hagopian: No, absolutely not. It is just meant to make them bear responsibility and draw their attention.

AL-HAWADITH: What is your position on the Soviet Union? Is your organization nationalist or socialist internationalist?

Hagop Hagopian: By determining our political strategy and political line, and by our evaluation of the international struggles in the world, we have defined our enemy as the fascist Turkish regime, with all its military and civilian institutions. We also consider that anyone supporting this regime falls into the category of enemies. We consider all countries in the socialist world to be the friends of our people and our cause, and we consider all revolutionary and liberation movements to be strategic allies of our revolution.

AL-HAWADITH: Many organizations have abandoned the method of revolutionary violence to attain objectives, including the /Palestine/ Liberation Organization. What is your opinion on that?

Hagop Hagopian: The Liberation Organization has not abandoned revolutionary violence. Proof of that is the fact that some of the detachments that are represented in the Liberation Organization still embrace armed conflict as a means of struggling for the liberation of Palestine and the return of the dispossessed Palestinian people to their territory.

AL-HAWADITH: The Armenians have faced many forms of oppression. Why have the retaliatory operations been restricted to Turkey alone?

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Hagop Hagopian: They haven't. First, our activity is not retaliatory, as you said. We have defined our enemy as the fascist Turkish regime, with all its institutions, and everyone supporting this regime. We have translated these slogans into action. We have attacked Turkish institutions, have struck out at the institutions that are allied with this regime and have managed to make some people neutral. For example, Switzerland sided with the Turkish regime, but recently it took a neutral position, and we issued a statement, on January 1982, requesting all detachments of the Armenian revolution to stop their military strikes against Swiss institutions throughout the world and inside Switzerland as a consequence of Switzerland's understanding of the Armenian cause and its agreement to hold a political trial of one of our fighters who is imprisoned in its prisons, considering our fighting man a political prisoner. I consider that this is a good victory in the context of the progress of the Armenian cause. France has also by exceptional decree given the heroes of the Van operation the title of political prisoners, because there is no law in France which considers prisoners political persons. It has given them all the rights all political prisoners enjoy and it will hold a completely political trial. These are all the fruits that we are gleaming on behalf of the struggles we are waging.

AL-HAWADITH: Through whom were the contacts made?

Hagop Hagopian: As the French government stated to AL-HAWADITH magazine, contacts are made through its senior officials.

AL-HAWADITH: Have you held joint meetings with Swiss officials?

Hagop Hagopian: Absolutely not.

AL-HAWADITH: So how did you reach an agreement?

Hagop Hagopian: Through intermediaries.

AL-HAWADITH: What conditions do you impose on Turkey to make peace?

Hagop Hagopian: There will be no peace with Turkey except when our territory is liberated in full.

AL-HAWADITH: What is the nature of your relationship with the Armenian organization "Orly?"

Hagop Hagopian: There is actually no relationship. We were taken by surprise by the Orly organization. However, as you know, contacts have been made between us and we met and we held conversations with the Orly leaders, offering the necessary support. They really proved their courage when they managed to compel the French government to release the fighting man Dimitri Georgiou, who is sitting with you.

AL-HAWADITH: Is Beirut a major springboard for your army to all areas of the world?

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Hagop Hagopian: Beirut, to us, is like the other capitals of countries in the world, since you know the nature of the composition of the Armenian people. Therefore one can say that it is not a major springboard.

AL-HAWADITH: Are there any relations between you and the Red Brigades, the Bader Meinhof Organization and the Japanese Red Army?

Hagop Hagopian: We have already answered this question in previous statements to the world press. We have relations with all revolutionary detachments that are struggling directly or indirectly to wrest their people's rights from the colonialists.

AL-HAWADITH: Do these organizations receive training in your camps, for instance?

Hagop Hagopian: No. They do not need to get trained in our camps. They have everything they need. We have no needs but have everything we want. Relations among us are equal and revolutionary. We learn from their experiences and they learn from ours.

AL-HAWADITH: And you--where do you get your training?

Hagop Hagopian: We get our training in our limited headquarters and camps. When we say that, you must believe it, because all we need to do is fire pistols, throw bombs and set explosives. We do not need big, extensive camps, because we are not carrying out a street or mountain war.

AL-HAWADITH: What is your connection with the Liberation Organization?

Hagop Hagopian: Relations are good, because they represent the Palestinian peoples' cause.

AL-HAWADITH: What is the Armenian church's relationship to you?

Hagop Hagopian: We take pride in the Armenian church, as they take pride in our struggle; here one cannot distinguish between the church and revolutionary struggle. They are carrying out their mission of preserving the holy places and churches in exile, and we are carrying out our mission of regaining our land and therefore returning to the land together. We complement each other, and therefore we are not Communists.

AL-HAWADITH: Do you have Orthodox and Catholics in your ranks, or is it restricted to the Orthodox?

Hagop Hagopian: Of course we include all groups in our movement.

AL-HAWADITH: What are the conditions for membership in your organization, as far as the Armenians go?

Hagop Hagopian: We naturally have conditions. One can discuss some of these but for security reasons we will not discuss others. Some conditions of membership are:

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1. Complete and full readiness to carry out the resolutions of the political, military and mass organization.
2. The individual must not have social obligations.
3. He must have some political awareness.

These are just the three conditions that we reveal.

AL-HAWADITH: How many personnel do you have?

Hagop Hagopian: We have partisans in all areas of the world. For example, we were surprised to find that organizations of Armenian army partisans and popular and political organizations were formed in most countries of the world, as is clearly apparent from the newspapers they issue endorsing the army's political platform.

AL-HAWADITH: Are there non-Armenian members in your organization?

Hagop Hagopian: (No answer).

AL-HAWADITH: What percentage of the armenians do you represent?

Hagop Hagopian: As an Armenian army, one can evaluate that from the support we as a military force receive from all Armenian circles.

AL-HAWADITH: It has been said that you resort to the use of threats against rich Armenians to finance your activity. What is the truth of this statement?

Hagop Hagopian: Western papers have raised this point to slander our movement and therefore create a climate of tension in bourgeois Armenian circles.

AL-HAWADITH: How do you view Shaykh Bashir al-Jumay-yil's negative position regarding your organization?

Hagop Hagopian: We do not evaluate Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil on the basis of his negative evaluation of our organization, we evaluate Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil from the perspective of the interests of our Armenian masses in oriental areas. We reject acts of aggression against any Armenian citizen. When such acts occur, our response is very harsh and is aimed at the aggressor in his own home. We went through a provocative phase in the past, but now we are in a state of armistice. He has issued orders that Armenians are not to be harassed, and our commitment to the armistice with Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil arises from the national movement and the resistance's support for us. In addition, he knows full well that we can shut down and strike out at the Lebanese Forces' offices in all areas of the world.

AL-HAWADITH: What is your plan of action for the coming stage?

Hagop Hagopian: The fact is that our program is clear, and that is to continue to struggle to make our cause, which has been eradicated for more than 50 years,

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stand out, and consequently to realize our goal, in cooperation with the Kurdish revolutionary movements, the Arab revolutionary movements and the Turkish democratic political parties.

AL-HAWADITH: Can we soon expect you to carry out new operations?

Hagop Hagopian: Every day there is the expectation of new operations from us, but of course we will not reveal the nature of our targets or where they are focussed.

Note

In AL-HAWADITH's interview with an Armenian Secret Army leader published in the last issue, some mistakes were made which must be corrected. These are:

1. The question contained in the published text, phrased "Are there non-Armenian members in your organization?" and the answer in the form of "no answer," did not basically appear in the interview; this subject was not broached in any way, directly or indirectly.
2. In the answer to the question "How do you view Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil's negative position regarding your organization?" the word "lack" was dropped inadvertently; the paragraph appeared as "arises from the national movement and the resistance's support for us" instead of "arises from the lack." End of note.

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Our war with Turkey is a war against the enemy (photographed by Joseph Nakhlah).

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Hagop Hagopian (an alias) replies to AL-HAWADITH's questions.



Dimitri Georgiou was recently released by the French authorities.

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FRANCE

'ACTION DIRECT' TIES WITH ECOLOGISTS, ULTRA-LEFT PRISONERS CITED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 May 82 p 28

[Article by J.-C. R: "Bastions of the Ultra-Left"]

[Text] Has the amnesty of 10 May turned the members of the toughest French terrorist group "Action Directe," who have been responsible for hold-up murders, crimes and attacks with explosives and automatic weapons, into peaceful squatters? Quite the contrary.

On 9 April, the "squats" of the 18th district--of Goutee-d'Or, Poissoniere house, and Rue de la Charbonniere--received another visit from the police. However, this time it was not the Special Security Corps or police from the district station. These were inspectors of the judicial police.

The hideout of "Action Directe," a clandestine terrorist movement, had just been surrounded. It was 1730 hours. Three bulletproof vests, a pumpgun, and a pistol were seized, as well as documents and radio equipment in the occupied buildings.

A few hours earlier on the same day, on Rue Borrego in the 20th district, a trap laid by the Judicial Police at a garage where a stock of military weapons was concealed enabled the arrest of Joelle Aubron and Mohand Hamani, both urgently wanted terrorists.

The former is suspected also of having opened fire on the police in 1981 during a hold-up aimed at padding the secret funds of "Action Directe." The latter had already been caught in an antiterrorist sweep in March 1980. He had been questioned at a house in Brusac (Var) where members of "Action Directe" and the Italian "Red Brigades" were staying. In fact, after discovery of the arms cache on 9 April in Rue de la Charbonniere, the Judicial Police had expected to capture the main leaders of the hard-core branch ("political-military section") of "Action Directe," i.e. Jean-Marc Rouillan, founder of the movement, and his companion Nathalie Mengon, accused of having fired on inspectors of the secret police in 1978. However, taking advantage of a "leak," Mengon and Rouillan escaped in time on 9 April from the "Peasants and Workers Group of the 18th District." Under this deceptive title, the "squats" of the 18th have in reality become the French bastion of anarchism and terrorism. Appealing to different susceptibilities, they draw dissident ecologists, ultra-Left groups of soldiers and prisoners, etc.

Weapon Used in an Assassination

"Action Directe" had also secretly brought their immigrant Algerians, Tunisians, and Truks, all preaching Third World revolution and functioning as a support network for various clandestine armed struggle organizations.

At the beginning of the year, the police thus discovered that people were exchanging more than ideas in these "squats." Molotov cocktails were seized. Rouillan and Menigon were reportedly questioned on the subject for a few hours then released. Since then, the cooperation between "Action Directe" and international terrorist movements such as the "Lebanese Armed Units" has been confirmed.

One of the automatic weapons in the Rue Borrego arms cache had been used in an anti-Israeli attack in Paris, and the printshop which put out the "Action Directe" leaflets was also printing the communique of the "Lebanese Armed Units" which was responsible for recent murders of two diplomats, one American, the other Israeli, in France. For the present, the "Action Directe" squatters have only been charged with "residence violation."

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CSO: 6131/505

FRANCE

DEMOBILIZATION OF JUDICIAL SYSTEM, INCREASED TERRORISM SEEN

Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 May 82 p 2

[Article by Gerard Nirascou]

[Text] "Insecurity and terrorism don't exist; they are inventions of the right." How many times did we hear this phrase from the opposition prior to May 1981? Once in power, the language of the victors hardly changed. For months, for nearly a year, France was described or depicted as a haven of peace and tranquility in the middle of a world in crisis by the president of the republic down to the lowest state secretaries, as well as by the prime minister, the minister of the interior and the minister of justice. Even on 1 April, right after the attack on the Capitole, in response to a FIGARO editorial which condemned the government's indifference to the rising crime wave and number of attacks, didn't Pierre Mauroy state: "Let's not exaggerate, France is not teetering on the brink of terrorism."

The change in tone is quite recent. Gaston Defferre, the first to do so, had, during a harsh confrontation with Robert Badinter over the issue of identity checks, expressed a view which was more in line with the deteriorating situation. Which didn't prevent Francois Mitterrand and Pierre Mauroy from proclaiming loudly, but not without hesitation and confusion, that the Security and Freedom law would be repealed and that identity checks would be permitted, except in the presence of the courts, only "in certain places and if the threat is immediate." It actually took the explosion in Rue Marbeuf, on 22 April, to bring about a change to really new language. The nightmarish vision of a devastated street in central Paris, stained with the blood of innocent victims (1 dead and 63 injured), definitely swept away all utopian dreams.

But between 10 May 1981 and 22 April 1982, the harm had been done. In the frenzy of change and under the leadership of Robert Badinter, the minister of justice, who, in this instance, was only implementing the socialist program, a systematic dismantling of the judicial system was begun: the death penalty was abolished, without any replacement penalty being established; the Court of National Security was eliminated, as was the standing tribunal of the armed forces; one of the broadest amnesties (more than 6,000 prisoners, 9,000 including commutations of sentences) was declared, even for dangerous terrorists; while awaiting its repeal, the Security and Freedom law was drained of its content by ministerial directives conveyed to the public prosecutor's

office. At the same time, the magistracy was taken in hand and "purged." A number of members of the Magistracy Union, closely associated with the new government and whose Rousseauist and humanist views have permeated the socialist breviary concerning judicial and penal affairs, were appointed to key posts.

During the same period, the police force was going through a crisis whose effects are still being felt today. A witch hunt led to the finger being put on the heads of almost all departments and major services. As for the rank and file, traumatized by an avalanche of official statements in which they were accused of having served as a militia for employers, of being deeply racist and of making promises to the far right, they were even more demobilized as they helplessly witnessed the establishment of a system in which criminals would systematically enjoy the understanding and indulgence of judges.

The Campaign Against Terrorism

The attack in Rue Marbeuf, coming a few weeks after the attack on the Capitole, after the assassination of an American military attache, Charles Ray, and an Israeli diplomat, Yacov Barsimentov, caused a shock, which was magnified in public opinion by the constant rise of petty and moderately serious crime affecting practically every French citizen, whether residing in the city or the country. The best proof of this: Insecurity, which was ranked fourth or fifth among the public's concerns in polls taken a few months ago, is number one today.

Francois Mitterrand, the president of the republic, has drawn some conclusions. In his Gueret speech on 2 May, he acknowledged that the problem of insecurity was serious, "although we must not allow ourselves to become panic-stricken." He appeared even clearer concerning terrorism: "I shall personally see to it that the campaign against terrorism is carried out in an implacable manner, but with respect for basic liberties." This new tone is also found in the remarks of the prime minister and in those of the minister of the interior.

But a change in tone is not enough to formulate a different policy. And that is where the problem lies.

A campaign against insecurity and terrorism is not declared by mere speeches. Everything is proceeding as though, although the evil has been recognized, there is a refusal to use effective measures to achieve results.

First of all, it is not a question of going back over the destructive measures taken since 10 May, measures which leave judges and police particularly helpless and which constitute an encouragement for crime. And this applies to both simple crimes and terrorism.

With regard to terrorism itself, examples abound in which the will to combat it is frustrated in the field by the dominant ideology or, quite simply, by a number of political commitments.

In the case of the right of asylum, the government has decided that France would constitute a country of reference. If the aim is noble, the result is disastrous. More than 180,000 refugees have moved to our country today.

It is unrealistic or hypocritical to think that some of them will not engage in political activism, with all the consequences which that may have. Stating, as Gaston Defferre did, that we will not tolerate a single failure of the duty of self-control required of them makes no sense: The police cannot watch over such a mass of individuals. Wouldn't the problem instead be that of limiting the influx of these refugees?

In the case of extradition, France still refuses to sign the Strasbourg convention on terrorism. The reason: It makes no distinction between a political militant and a common-law criminal. Here again, the reasons, however noble they may be, are belied by the facts. It is common knowledge that many Spanish Basques, who have taken refuge in France and whose extradition Madrid loudly demands, continue to fight and to maintain Spanish terrorism because of France's position in this regard. The same is true of some refugee nationals of African and Middle Eastern countries.

And what can be said about individuals whom the FRG and Italy ask us to extradite and who continue, from French territory, clandestine operations against countries whose democratic nature is difficult to deny? Especially since there exists--all experts make this claim and can prove it--an international terrorist association which could not care less about borders or ideologies. All terrorist movements help and support each other. Agreeing to accept them on one's soil is the equivalent of encouraging the development of a national terrorism.

This is what is currently taking place in France, where three kinds of terrorism coexist and thrive: Basque, Corsican and that of the far left. Is there any need to recall that two CRS [Republican Security Companies (State Mobile Police)] were killed at Saint-Etienne-de-Baigorri by French independence militants closely associated with Spanish Basques? Are we to forget about the legionnaire killed near Aleria by the FLNC [Corsican National Liberation Front], a Corsican extremist movement whose ties with certain special services in the Middle East are clear? Is it pointless to note that the Direct Action group has been trying to reestablish itself for several months and that it could receive notoriety before long, while bearing in mind the ties which its members maintain with members of the Italian Red Brigades or German Red Army Faction, who have taken refuge in France.

The Two Ideologies of the PS

Under these circumstances, it is permissible to wonder what could be the outcome of an antiterrorist campaign of a socialist government which is caught up in certain principles which are not in keeping with a more and more exacting and ruthless reality.

Socialist language concerning terrorism has changed, but concerning crime, the official doctrine reaffirmed by Francois Mitterrand--also in his Gueret speech--which it was believed had been somewhat modified after certain statements by Gaston Defferre, remains unchanged. There is no question of giving the police greater authority and no question of showing sternness toward criminals. It is by changing society that we will put an end to insecurity, which, at least it is now recognized, is real.

The president of the republic stated clearly: "It is through solidarity that we will put an end to crime ..." In an interview with a provincial daily newspaper, the minister of justice, Robert Badinter, also explained on 2 May: "The security of citizens depends less on repressive legal texts--we have a full arsenal of them--than on the measures implemented to reduce crime. By that I mean that all actions in favor of maintaining security must be conceived and carried out with regard for reality, as it exists in this or that city, district or street ..."

On the same day, Francois Mitterrand and Robert Badinter reaffirmed in the same terms what the campaign against crime should be. Both statements are in total contradiction to the recent remarks of Gaston Defferre, for whom security must be assured at all costs, including by forceful means. It also seems that it is here, on this issue, that there are differences and hesitation within the government after a year of socialist rule. Regarding insecurity--and even terrorism--there are two opposite ideological factions within the PS: One recommends firmness while the other, more doctrinaire, believes that a change in society can solve all problems.

There is hardly any doubt that if insecurity should continue to increase--which is suggested by all statistics for the first months of the year and barring a suicidal attitude concerning the next municipal elections--the government will be forced to review its choices. A change of course that would not occur without a confrontation within the Socialist Party.

For the time being, after a year in power, we can only note that the battle for security has largely been lost: Crime has risen and terrorism has increased, while the police are disorganized and the courts are helpless.

Death Penalty Abolished

Four fundamental texts have been rescinded or eliminated at the request of the present minister of justice, Robert Badinter.

Elimination of the Court of National Security: This was approved on 17 July 1981 by a hand vote of members of parliament. From now on, in peacetime, crimes and offenses against national security will be examined and judged by common-law jurisdictions and according to the regulations of the Penal Procedure Code.

When this issue was debated, Robert Badinter told the National Assembly: "French justice must be exemplary. But French justice will not be as long as its institutions include this special jurisdiction, which is open to criticism because of its motivation, is unjustifiable because of its regulations and condemnable for its mistakes."

Abolition of the death penalty: This was approved on 18 September 1981 by a vote of 369 to 113 National Assembly members. No substitute penalty has yet been proposed.

At the rostrum of the assembly, Robert Badinter stated in particular: "In the name of what competence, what diversion is it constantly repeated: 'Think

of the victims!' We think about the victims constantly, but by thus exploiting their misfortune, the aim is to oversensitize, to silence reason in order to maintain the old order of things."

Elimination of the Antiviolence Law [against damage to property by demonstrators]: This was adopted by National Assembly members on the night of 25 November 1981. This law, mainly included in Article 314 of the Penal Code, established penal and pecuniary liability for perpetrators of violent acts.

At the assembly rostrum, Robert Badinter said that this was "a dangerous text" and condemned "a circumstantial law which had survived the great fear of 1968."

Elimination of the Standing Tribunal of the Armed Forces (TPFA): This was approved on 16 April 1982 by National Assembly members.

In an interview with the newspaper LIBERATION, Robert Badinter explained: "The law eliminating the TPFA is an historic text from a symbolic standpoint, since--like the abolition of the death penalty--it is one of those laws which break with a long past and turn a new page in the history of our system of justice ... Elimination of the TPFA draws 650 years of French history to a close ... No more military tribunals and no more military judges in France during peacetime ..."

Attacks: A Long List

Over the past 12 months, terrorist acts have increased in France. But it was during last fall that the phenomenon accelerated sharply. The principal attacks include:

26 October 1981: Two bombs, one in Fouquets' restroom and another in front of the Publicis drugstore on the Champs-Elysees.

29 October: A bomb destroyed the Berlitz Cinema on the Boulevard des Italiens: three persons injured.

5 November: A bomb exploded in the baggage-claim area of the Lyon railroad station: no casualties.

12 November: Christian Chapman, the American charge d'affaires in Paris, narrowly escaped from a killer who shot at him with a 7.65 [caliber] revolver. Washington accused Libya.

16 November: A bomb destroyed a baggage-claim area in the East railroad station. Three travelers were injured. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by an Armenian terrorist organization, the Orly group.

20 November: A bomb ravaged McDonald's restaurant on Boulevard Saint-Michel, one person injured.

20 December: A bomb exploded in the headquarters of a transportation company, Botrans, which specialized in trade with Eastern countries. Signed claim of responsibility: Charles Martel.

23 December: "Direct Action" claimed responsibility for four explosions in Paris, one against the licensed Rolls Royce dealership.

18 January 1982: Col Charles Ray, military attache to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, was assassinated in front of his residence by several 7.65 [caliber] bullets. The Americans accused extremist Palestinian circles.

3 February: Two legionnaires were attacked near Aleria, in Corsica. One, Renato Rossi, was killed and the other was seriously wounded. Several days later, Paris and the province had two sleepless nights: a total of more than 150 explosions. The Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) claimed responsibility for all these operations.

19 March: Two CRS on patrol at Saint-Etienne-de-Baigorry, in the French Basque country, were hit with several blasts of machinegun fire. Jacques Bouillier died on the spot, while Bernard Roussaria died several weeks later. The attack was probably made by members of Iparetarrak, the French Basque independence organization.

29 March: Explosion on the Trans-Europ Express train, the Capitole, while traveling at 140 km/hour near Limoges. The device, a high-powered bomb, had been placed in the head railroad car. Five persons, including the sister of former Finance Minister Jean-Pierre Fourcade, were killed and 27 others injured more or less seriously. No claim of responsibility and no clues as yet for the police.

1 April: The offices of an annex of the Israeli Embassy in Paris, on Boulevard Malesherbes, were machinegunned. The persons responsible, Joelle Aubron and Mohand Hamami, closely associated with the far-left movement "Direct Action," were arrested several days later.

3 April: The second secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Paris, Yacov Barsimantov --probably an agent of Mossad, the Israeli secret service--was shot down in front of his residence by a young woman with several 7.65 [caliber] bullets. It was proven that this weapon was the same one which was used to kill Charles Ray, the American military attache.

22 April: Explosion of a booby-trapped car at 33 Rue Marbeuf in Paris, in front of the offices of the pro-Iraqi Lebanese newspaper, AL WATAN AL ARABI. A young woman was killed, 63 persons were injured and damage was considerable. Interior Minister Gaston Defferre held Syrian services responsible.

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CSO: 6131/507

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FRANCE

DEFFERRE ON BATTLE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 7 May 82 pp 30-31

[Interview with Gaston Defferre, minister of state for interior and decentralization, by Florence Portes; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Mr Defferre, you are acting prime minister, and you have said that France is currently threatened by international terrorism. What do you mean exactly?

Gaston Defferre: There are two kinds of terrorism: internal terrorism among the French and international terrorism imported from abroad. I would like to remind you that I began by emphasizing that national terrorism in France is clearly receding. I stress the point because this is due to the policy pursued by the socialist government since 10 May. That being said, I appeal to the common sense and patriotism of all the French, asking them to understand that it is fortunate that a truce has been reached with those autonomist movements. If the attacks were to resume, civil peace would definitely be compromised.

[Question] You don't want to be fighting more than one fire during an offensive by international terrorism?

[Answer] I am not talking about an offensive by international terrorism. I will simply take four examples. That bomb in the Capitol--was it an attack by international terrorism? We have no proof that it was. The tests did not turn up anything. We have the feeling that it was, however. Then there were the assassinations of an American diplomat and an Israeli diplomat: in this case we know that they were foreign in origin. And the attack on Marbeuf Street: we know the context--a Lebanese newspaper had received threats from Syrians. We may have other clues tomorrow, but for now, there is every reason to believe that this, too, was an international terrorist attack.

[Question] The French have the impression that if international terrorism is knocking at our door, it is because the socialist government, with its policy of providing a "land of refuge," has opened the door wide to foreigners.

[Answer] Giscard had to cope with the same problems that we are having. Carlos was in Paris when he threw a grenade into a Paris cafe. The Japanese Yukata

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Furuya was arrested on French soil. Since 10 May 1981, terrorists have not been reentering France as easily as before. I noted during a recent meeting with the ministers of interior from Germany, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland that my colleagues are having the same problems that we are. And that among all our Western countries, it is useless to try to decide which one has the sad honor of being the capital of international terrorism.

[Question] What is your thinking and that of the government?

[Answer] To combat international attacks. There are several methods. The one adopted by the previous government consisted of giving in to threats. For example, when Carlos demanded the release of the Japanese Yukata Furuya, who had been arrested in France, Carlos threw a grenade on St Germain Boulevard, and the result was 2 dead and 30 wounded. Two weeks later, the same group took hostages at France's embassy in The Hague, and Furuya was released. A second example is Abou Daoud, the Palestinian responsible for the slaughter at the Munich games. He was arrested on French soil on 13 January 1977 and released on 17 January. Once again, the government of the time gave in.

[Question] So?

[Answer] So the question I am asking is whether the method that consists of giving in is the right one or whether, on the contrary, while it may seem effective at the moment, it does not pave the way for tragedies later. In other words, releasing people who have committed odious crimes really amounts to encouraging them to do it again and to putting ourselves in a situation where we will give in again. On the other hand, standing up to them may also cause terrible tragedies at the start. But if, while standing up to them, we also adopt an offensive attitude, we can also strike a few blows of our own against those committing the crimes and effectively deter them from coming to settle their own affairs on our territory.

[Question] You are referring here to the case of the friends of Carlos (Bruno Breguet and Magdalena Kopp) who have just been sentenced to prison. Their attorney Verges predicted that Carlos would demand their release. What has the government decided to do about that?

[Answer] On that point, as on the question of the specific tactics the government has decided to use to combat international terrorism, I cannot reveal my intentions to you! If I did, the government would lose some of its possibilities for action. "Secrecy in action is essential," General De Gaulle used to say--we won't go all the way back to what Machiavelli said. But secrecy in a fight of this kind is decisive. There is no question of violating it. After all, all the terrorists would have to do is buy a copy of PARIS MATCH to find out what we intended to do!

[Question] You have announced, however, that the government would be calm and determined but offensive.

[Answer] In order to understand our analysis of the problem, let us take the example of the incident on Marbeuf Street. First hypothesis: it was a case of

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foreigners fighting among themselves. If they want to fight each other, let them do it somewhere else. The second hypothesis concerns the question of whether one of those countries has enough of a grudge against France to try to take revenge on it and to come strike their blows here.

[Question] What about the first hypothesis?

[Answer] That brings up the problem of the conditions under which the right of asylum must be exercised. The right of asylum is a basic principle to which France adheres strongly. But from now on, it will be limited to what it should be, and as a result, those who benefit from it have no right to engage in political fights and even less to commit assaults.

That is why instructions were issued on 23 April for all French diplomats abroad to be particularly careful about issuing visas. We are also going to take a census of all foreigners who might be a threat to France's security, including those who might be here officially. Those whom we feel should not remain in France will be asked to leave the territory.

[Question] What if you have reason to think that foreign governments are trying to destabilize France?

[Answer] Let us suppose--and this is our second hypothesis--that certain countries would like to take revenge on France and its policy. I notice that the people who, in general, shed blood and try to impress public opinion to make a government give in do not rest until they are released after they are arrested. Thank God, France has many possibilities for action in the political and diplomatic area. But it also has possibilities for fighting in the field. As a result, there is nothing to indicate that we will come out the losers. I certainly do not want us to be forced into having recourse to violent means or to the resources of international politics, but France has the right to defend itself, and if need be, it will take the necessary steps, whether they involve political, diplomatic, or police action.

[Question] So is that what you are thinking of when you talk about using the offensive method?

[Answer] Listen, I am talking from experience. I know about the underground--I was in it. I headed a network that had three broadcast links with Great Britain. When the Nazi forces got too close and we were on the point of being caught, we tried not to be arrested. What was true of us is also true of every terrorist in the world. In our case, we were attacking the occupiers. Today's terrorists are attacking established regimes either because they want the society that exists to collapse, or because they are anarchists with no purpose other than destruction, or because they have a grudge against the policy of the country targeted. Well, a successful offensive policy "destabilizes," as the saying goes. Today the French Government has a duty not to be weak. If we organize effective action against the terrorists, we can deal them a severe blow.

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[Question] You claim that you have not yet chosen either the Giscard-style defensive method or the offensive method, but everything you say indicates that you have chosen the offensive method.

[Answer] Both of them can be employed successively or simultaneously in differing places, countries, or circumstances. Mitterrand telephoned me several times throughout the day on 22 October. The next morning, he called me in at 0845 hours to hold a meeting with General Saulnier, his chief of staff; Marion, who heads the DGSE; Grimaud, my directeur de cabinet; and Chalet, director of the DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance]. We spent 1.5 hours in his office. That just shows how personally concerned he is about what must be done to insure the security of the French.

[Question] During that meeting, did you determine that the French police have the means for effective and coordinated antiterrorist action?

[Answer] I won't make a list of all our services for you. As far as the coordination of information is concerned, we have scheduled weekly meetings, especially since the first threats by Carlos. After 23 April, it was decided at Francois Mitterrand's request that we would hold daily meetings with all the intelligence services in my office at the Ministry of Interior. The basis of action--the secret of success--is first of all to be quickly and well informed, and that is why we have the coordination structure under my own responsibility. We will prepare a summary report every day and send it to the President. When he considers it necessary, he will call us in for a meeting, as he did this morning.

[Question] You talk a lot about Carlos. He in particular seems to worry you. Does anyone know where he is? One day he is said to be on French soil, the next day he is reported to be in northern Italy, and so on.

[Answer] The harmful activity he directs leads him to move about a lot and to make people think he moves about even more. That is one of his weapons. He has a greater effect on people's thinking by making them think he is present everywhere, and someday he may succeed in being regarded as one of those mythical people said to have the gift of ubiquity, being simultaneously in Libya, South Yemen, Syria, France, Belgium, and God knows where else.

[Question] In your opinion, who manipulates Carlos?

[Answer] It seems to me that at the start, he was used by countries that did not accept the ideas of a certain number of Western nations.

[Question] Are you thinking of the USSR?

[Answer] I am thinking of Syria, South Yemen, and Libya (it is not certain whether Libya plays the same role today). The weapons are in fact supplied by the Eastern countries. Those countries, which disagree with our policy and engage in espionage--and they are not the only ones to do so--have tried to attack our regimes by using their own methods, which are those of terrorism. The result has been the training of a certain number of men who later, as they

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became more important themselves, have continued to form groups which are enfeoffed to their original leaders or which, trapped by their role, play it with conviction. That seems to be the case with Carlos. They are the most dangerous ones.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because when one is a terrorist by conviction, one wants to kill and perhaps to die as well. I say perhaps because when someone--like Carlos, for example--has been made a star for several years by the media and becomes a kind of personality, it is more difficult to die. So the individual exposes himself less. Carlos started out by carrying out orders, but he has now become the No 1 terrorist--the one hunted by every police force in the world. But perhaps he still has the will or the ability to carry out "operations" and to risk his neck. It is not impossible. I tend to believe it.

[Question] Do you think that he may carry out his death threats against you? Has he repeated his threats to you?

[Answer] You know, when someone receives a letter like that one, he doesn't need a second one to understand what it means.

[Question] Do you think he played a part in the attack on Marbeuf Street?

[Answer] It is possible. At this point I cannot say.

[Question] You seem to be pointing to the Syrians in particular.

[Answer] I have said that the government had its reasons for acting as it did. As you can imagine, we did not decide lightly to expel those diplomats.

[Question] The editor of the Lebanese newspaper said he had warned France that our ambassador in Beirut, Louis Delamare, was going to be assassinated by the Syrians. We did nothing about it. And our ambassador was assassinated. The editor was also threatened. Why were the Syrian diplomats not expelled sooner?

[Answer] We were quite certain that members of the Syrian Embassy were going beyond their role as diplomats, a role that does entitle them to provoke attacks. So we knew that they had a grudge against that Lebanese newspaper. The newspaper was therefore being guarded by the police, and so was its editor. That is no doubt the reason why the bomb was placed in a vehicle. That type of crime is undetectable. The bomb injured many people, and it undoubtedly would have injured many more if it had been placed in the building, because several victims on the various floors were injured by flying glass. The police did their job, but unfortunately, one cannot prevent everything. The case has been referred to the courts, and I cannot say any more about what will be done or discovered from now on.

[Question] If the police did their job, who didn't? The Ministry of External Relations?

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[Answer] It didn't have the same grounds that it does now. Besides, it is not the job of the Ministry of External Relations to expel diplomats.

[Question] You mentioned the unofficial role that Libya might have played--or could have played--in these terrorist acts. But Qadhdhafi's No 2 man, Major Jalloud, is making an official visit to Paris.

[Answer] Every opportunity to open the eyes of those governments should be taken advantage of. Who knows whether these talks with the Libyan leaders at this moment will not save us from troubles to come and whether the Libyans, because of their contacts with other countries having reasons to be interested in terrorism, will not be useful to us? In the fight we are engaged in, all methods must be used.

[Question] Let us get back to the means at our disposal on French soil. It is in the countries whose legal arsenal is weak that terrorism is most developed (Italy). Don't you believe in the need to strengthen our own?

[Answer] I don't think so.

[Question] I mean--the State Security Court has been abolished. Is it not necessary to...?

[Answer] It would not have added anything to our possibilities for action.

[Question] No, but restoration of the 12 days of police custody provided by that court would facilitate investigations by the examining magistrate, would it not?

[Answer] Listen--48 hours, 5 days, or 10 days of additional police custody do not change anything. A magistrate can very well conduct his investigation without preliminary police custody of such length. And there is no need for emergency laws. The important thing--the basis of everything--is the possibility of conducting identity checks, and that is what I have been fighting for. To keep them.

[Question] In what form, so that they will retain all their effectiveness?

[Answer] I have been insistent about wanting police officers to be able to conduct identity checks in specific places if the security of individuals and property is in immediate danger. I am insisting on the identity checks because most of the important arrests we have made were possible because of those checks. We are a socialist government, and everyone knows that we do not want to infringe on freedoms. But freedom depends on security above all else.

[Question] If we want to sum up our talk, can we say that terrorism can be combated through offensive action combined with calm determination?

[Answer] Of course it can be combated in that way! It is when one has the political will to insure security and to do everything necessary to that end that one has a clear conscience. Look, if I had started out by bullying the

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French, and if we had not taken into account the just demands of some of the provincial inhabitants--such as the Corsicans, the Basques, and the Bretons-- I would feel less motivated than I do now to combat the forces of terrorism with the utmost firmness. It is precisely because a special status for Corsica has been proposed that we are taking steps to insure the development of regional ideas and that the government has the right to be firm. Because France's policy as conducted abroad by the president of the republic is a just and balanced policy that does not seek either to impose itself by force or to dominate weak nations--and even less to draw advantages from them. It is in the light of that policy that everyone's duty, and mine in particular, is to set an example of determination and strength in the fight against terrorism.

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FRANCE

CHANGED STYLE, FUTURE POTENTIAL FOR TERRORIST ACTS

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 7 May 82 pp 32-33

[Article by Gerard de Villiers]

[Text] Two weeks ago, Gerard de Villiers wrote in these columns: "The five who died in the Capitole did so perhaps because of an obscure inter-Arab quarrel. If so, others will follow." Events have tragically proven him right: the victims (1 dead and 62 wounded) of the boobytrapped Opel that exploded at 0902 hours on Monday morning in front of 33 Marbeuf Street are indeed the victims of a real secret war.

A savage war has been declared between the Syrian secret services on the one hand and their enemies--chiefly France, Iraq, and Israel--on the other.

Until the recent past, Arab terrorists operated in France against non-French targets. Examples: the murder of U.S. Lt Col Charles Ray, the murder of Jacob Abrasimov, adviser at the Israeli Embassy, and the attack on the Israeli trade mission.

Over the past few months, however, that "ordinary" terrorism, which successive French governments basically tolerated, has been overlaid with a new kind of terrorism, directed this time against the French. Five attacks are in this category. In chronological order, they are as follows:

1. The assassination in Beirut of French Ambassador Delamare.
2. The abortive attack by the two terrorists Bruno Breguet and Magdalena Kopp, who were sentenced on 23 April after an incredible stroke of luck resulted in their arrest as they were preparing to place a high-powered explosive device in the city hall.
3. The attack on the Capitole.
4. The murder in Beirut of Guy Cavallo and his wife. Guy Cavallo was a code clerk at the SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service] station in Beirut.
5. The attack on Marbeuf Street.

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Those five attacks all have a common denominator. It is almost certain that they were carried out at the request of the Syrian special services. Why?

For a very simple reason: France has been trying for several months to strengthen the Libyan Army and pushing for the reconstruction of an independent Lebanon. The Syrians cannot go along with that. They consider any interference in Lebanese affairs to be an act of war. So they react in their own fashion. The first warning was the assassination of Ambassador Delamare, who was executed by the Shiite militia under the supervision of Syrian officers.

Since that was not enough, the Syrians decided to take the war to France. To do so, they subcontracted with one of the terrorist groups under their influence or, if one prefers, sharing their "sensitivity." It seems quite certain that the group they hired is headed by Carlos, who has worked for them before, who has numerous infrastructures in Europe, and who can call on European terrorists (German, Swiss, Italian, or French) to round out his troops.

That was the case with the first team sent in to sow terror in France: Bruno Breguet and Magdalena Kopp, both already on file as dangerous terrorists.

By chance, they were arrested. Carlos--and it was he--then had a double problem: to get them released and to continue the mission assigned to him by the Syrians. He could send a second team. Or, as is possible, he could call on French terrorists to do the job.

(It must not be forgotten that the weapon used to fire on the Israeli mission--a Sten submachinegun--was discovered in a cache belonging to Action Directe, a movement whose members were all granted amnesty after 10 May.) Carlos may have subcontracted the attack on the Capitol to them. The purpose of that attack was to put pressure on the French Government to free the first team--Bruno Breguet and Magdalena Kopp.

The government--to its complete credit--did not give in. It took Carlos 2 weeks to organize a new attack, again using a "mixed" Arab-European team. The woman who used false papers in Yugoslavia to rent the Opel that exploded on Marbeuf Street was not an Arab. On the other hand, a witness saw an Oriental-type man getting out of that car in the middle of the night. That attack killed two birds with one stone. Perpetrated on the day of the trial of the first terrorist team, it reminded the French Government that the relentless slaughter would continue as long as terrorists convicted in France were not released. At the same time, the boobytrapped car was placed in front of the anti-Syrian newspaper AL WATAN AL ARABI, thus serving as a serious warning to the newspaper. It is worth recalling that the attack on the Saint Germain Drugstore on 5 September 1974, which killed 2 and wounded 34, was committed by Carlos to make France release two Japanese terrorists belonging to his team. The government of the time gave in to the blackmail.

That is where we are today. The attacks are likely to continue for two reasons: Carlos or those acting for the Syrians will do everything possible to free their imprisoned accomplices, and the Syrians want France to stop showing an interest in Lebanon.

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If we want the blind or isolated killings to stop, we cannot be content with fine words and statements of principle.

There are two avenues to be explored. First of all, the infrastructures within the country that benefit the terrorists must be eliminated. That was the method used by the German BKA [Federal Criminal Police Bureau]. It means putting the terrorists in the position of fish out of water: preventing them from finding hideouts, false papers, weapons, or logistic support in France. This requires a lot of police work and, above all, political determination.

Naturally, the special police services can track down clandestine terrorists. But that is not enough if we do not attack what the German terrorists called the "legal people"--meaning sympathizers who provide the underground with valuable assistance either knowingly or as a result of manipulation. A few hours after the explosion on Marbeuf Street, attorney Verges, who was the lawyer for Bruno Breguet and Magdalena Kopp, was shouting at the magistrates as follows:

"No matter what verdict you render, my clients will be out of prison within 3 hours, 48 hours, or 3 months, because their friends will not give up."

His cynical and sinister rudeness shows that not everyone in France disapproves of the attacks. It is revealing that such remarks could be made a few hours after the massacre on Marbeuf Street and, especially, that the person making them was not penalized by the court.

Extreme leftwing militants also insulted the court when the sentences were pronounced. The police did not check anyone's identity, even though it is among such people that the support for the next "teams" sent to kill a few more French people is likely to be found. But it was by beaver-like work to set up files on all leftwing sympathizers with the German terrorists that the BKA was able to avert attacks and dismantle the Baader gang. The French police are capable of doing the same. All they have to do is receive their orders.

That action on the national level is not enough if we do not get to the source of the problem, which lies outside France. And that is the sphere of the DGSE. French counterespionage maintains "totem" relations--that is, reciprocal exchanges of information with countries abroad. So by cooperating with the Israeli, American, German, Italian, and even some Arab services, it can get a line on the networks and tiny groups and learn the identities of most of the terrorists. At this moment, we might be in a position to reach such an agreement. The Syrians and even people like Carlos are vulnerable. All it requires is credibility in deterrence and a pooling of resources. It is possible, and it has been done before. If Carlos disappeared from the French scene for a while, it was not by chance. He was being tracked down himself.

What was done before can be done again. The day when the terrorist teams or those who manipulate them know that they will get tit for tat will be the day when the war ends. Because no one is suicidal. And that includes the Syrians and Carlos Illich Ramirez.

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Terrorism has never understood any language except that of force. If those who govern France do not quickly become aware of that, the blind terror will continue, and the blood of innocent French people will flow again.

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FRANCE

RUE MARBEUF EDITOR ON SYRIAN TERRORIST TECHNIQUES

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 7 May 82 pp 32-33

[Interview with Walid Abou Zahr, editor of AL WATAN AL ARABI, by Patrick Forestier; date and place not specified]

[Text] For 6 months the managers of the weekly AL WATAN AL ARABI had known that an attack on their newspaper was being planned. On 19 December 1981, they had discovered and defused a boobytrapped package before it was too late. After that, 24 bodyguards kept watch on the building. But Walid Abou Zahr, the publication's editor, explains that the explosion on Marbeuf Street was also aimed at the French and France's policy in the Middle East. Here, for lack of proof, are his innermost convictions and his assumptions.

PARIS MATCH: How was the attack on Marbeuf Street set up?

Walid Abou Zahr: A commando group arrived from Syria. According to our information, which is based on sources in Beirut and Syria itself, between 100 and 200 persons have entered France and are scattered among the country's chief cities. Those people are divided into several categories. There are those who specialize in explosives, others who specialize in assassinations, and others who are experts in making threats.

[Question] Are those commando groups made up basically of Syrians?

[Answer] No. They are recruited in several countries. Their members usually use Lebanese passports because it is very easy at present to forge them. The latest wave of Syrians arrived in France 3 or 4 weeks ago. Using the pretext of illness, some are receiving care at hospitals. Others say they are here to preregister at a university to learn French, and still others pretend to be merchants working in the import-export trade who want to buy French products. And still others are here as tourists.

[Question] Are they in contact with the Syrian Embassy in Paris?

[Answer] No. They do not contact the embassy except as a last resort. There are still several secret services in Syria. There are six or seven intelligence

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centers. Most of the time, the embassy does not know anything about what is going on.

[Question] Then do Syrians come directly from Damascus to bring orders to their agents working in France?

[Answer] Absolutely. They are separated into several groups which, as I said, are scattered around in several French cities.

[Question] Why has France become the focus for the inter-Arab struggle?

[Answer] Since 10 May, it has been easier to come to France than to go to the FRG. Before, anybody could go to Berlin. Now that is over. Also since 10 May, France has been playing a decisive role in the Mideast crisis. That policy has had certain consequences. The Syrians are now trying to kill two birds with one stone. First of all, they want to retaliate for the role being played by France in Lebanon, and second, they really want to give the impression that there is an inter-Arab struggle on French territory. Let us take the example of the attack on Marbeuf Street. Our newspaper opposes the Syrians. They could respond to our arguments with arguments of their own. We have no tanks with which to face the Syrian regime. We have only our pens, but they reply with terrorism. But all those operations in France are actually aimed more at France than at us. When Ambassador Delamare was assassinated in Beirut, that was not directed against AL WATAN AL ARABI. When the two French civil servants were assassinated a few days ago, again in Beirut, that was not directed against AL WATAN AL ARABI, either. And lastly, when the French Embassy in Beirut was bombed, that, too, was not directed against AL WATAN AL ARABI. I think that what exists today is a plan--an anti-French strategy. France is the real target. And you are going to see other operations against France that are aimed at paralyzing its policy in the Middle East.

[Question] In your opinion, are the Syrians preparing for more actions?

[Answer] The Syrian services have become experts in explosives. Boobytrapped cars are a Syrian specialty. Since Carlos came on the scene, the Syrians want to go much farther. France is currently a great power. It must try to determine whether, behind all this fuss about Carlos, there is not a plot to disguise a more complex undertaking aimed at destabilization.

[Question] But Carlos--what is he doing now?

[Answer] The Syrians could easily answer your question.

[Question] Getting back to the attack on Marbeuf Street, was there cooperation between French and Syrian terrorists?

[Answer] Absolutely not. For actions that serious, the Syrians are very careful to maintain secrecy. They are afraid that if a European were caught, he would reveal the whole operation.

[Question] What was the scenario for the attack in Paris?

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[Answer] People must have arrived by way of Vienna or Amsterdam. They could easily enter France by car. Others perhaps came through Switzerland disguised as businessmen. And the last group came by plane. Entering France is no problem at all, because those coming here do not carry any weapons on them. They are given documents and weapons after they get here.

[Question] Through the embassy?

[Answer] How do you think it is possible to get 30 or 40 kilograms of explosives into France?

[Question] By diplomatic pouch?

[Answer] You have answered the question!

[Question] And what do we have to fear now?

[Answer] I will let you in on something. I believe that the Syrians are going to try to kidnap the French ambassador in Beirut. And they will try to exchange him for the two terrorists who were recently convicted in Paris. I am convinced of it.

[Question] Do you have anything to back up your suspicions concerning the Syrian involvement in the incident on Marbeuf Street?

[Answer] First of all, the arrival of so many of them. Second, the fact that they sent direct threats. They did it openly. Last 19 December, they placed a boobytrapped package in front of the newspaper office. The investigation revealed that they were indeed the ones responsible. The day before the attack, they were furious at French Television 1's coverage of the assassination of Ambassador Delamare. Syrian circles in Damascus announced that that broadcast was going to cost plenty. They clearly said that if French policy continued unchanged, they would strike in France. If they had placed the bomb on a train, Carlos would have been blamed. By placing it in front of our newspaper office, they in effect signed it.

[Question] Is France the target because it maintains good relations with Iraq?

[Answer] Yes, no doubt, but the Syrians are especially furious because France is getting involved in the Lebanese matter. They consider Lebanon their special preserve. For them, Lebanon is a sensitive spot. The Syrians have been looking for a pretext. When President Mitterrand went to Israël, it gave them a good opportunity to say that they opposed his policy. France has now suggested that the Lebanese crisis be internationalized. The Syrians will never accept that proposal. When Ambassador Delamare established contacts with the supporters of that solution, Syria condemned him to death.

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FRANCE

NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM STYLES, PREVENTION EXAMINED

Paris LATITUDE AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 82 pp 16-18

[Article by Antoine Bugev: "Terrorism The New Mercenaries"]

[Text] The Capitole, Rue Marbeuf. The terrorists have fully achieved their objective: to create a psychosis among a public who had believed France was secure from this kind of attack. After the initial surprise, the political establishment has had to recognize that the terrorist threat is a reality in France. How can we deal with this unnatural calamity?

The current terrorism has its roots in two foreign movements. In 1962, exactly 20 years ago, the Uruguayan Tupamaros began to show their face. In 1966, it was the turn of the Black Panthers to intrude on the American scene.

Their social origins--they worked through university campuses--as well as the spectacular nature of their operations--aimed primarily at sensation and at traumatizing the public--made these two groups the ancestors of modern terrorism.

During their 10 years of existence, the Tupamaros used all kinds of terrorist methods: abduction of foreign diplomats for ransom (the Brazilian consul, for example), execution of an American secret agent, and occupation of radio stations to broadcast communiques.

Until now the European had felt protected. Their experience in this area had been limited to the patriotic terrorism of the liberation wars and the protest movements which emerged out of May 1968 in France. However, the "angry ones" of May were quickly absorbed by a society in full economic expansion. The situation began to deteriorate in the 1970's in the FRG with the Baader gang. It would be 5 years later before the Middle East became an area subject to terrorism.

Berne Club

Forms of terrorism vary. There are three schools of terrorism: nihilism, the ancestor of violent action; national terrorism; and finally international terrorism. Take note, however, that use of the singular in the latter does not

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prove that there is a single headquarters, with a single leader. This international terrorism is currently the most important. It is a product of the national terrorisms which have today lost some momentum thanks to the efforts of the national police.

In France, we tried too long to ignore national terrorism. After all, occupying a police station or blowing up a tax collection office is not the stuff of history, whether the culprits are Bretons or Corsicans.

Since the main objective of Western ministers of interior is to have declining statistics, they are reluctant to include all terrorist acts. This is why they make some subtle distinctions in categories. We would hope that within their very secretive Berne Club they exchange accurate statistics. The intelligence services have indeed formed a club to meet regularly in Switzerland to compare their information in the beautiful and quiet town of Berne. This enables a fairly comprehensive approach to the terrorist phenomenon.

What do the terrorists want? The human and material assets of the opponent on his own ground are the primary target. This is true from the IRA attacks in London to the Direct Action attacks on banks in France. However, we must not ignore the so-called "external" operations to strike at the adversary outside his own territory, to destroy his interests abroad. Thus, the Armenians attack Turkish tourism offices anywhere in the world.

Even more elaborate are the attacks on the human and material assets of the adversary's allies. The Rue Marbeuf attack can be assigned to this category. It has yet to be proved that the Syrians were responsible. One of the objectives of this kind of attack is to gain an international audience. Such attacks are often the tactic of movement which are numerically or politically weak. The Basques or the Irish, who do not have a recognition problem, carry out their operations in their own country. This is also true of the Red Brigades and the Baader gang. Today, we are seeking more attacks on persons, as opposed to attacks on property as in the past.

The means employed tends to reflect the political nature of the movements because they do not all seek to have the same effect on the public. The extreme Right deliberately exercises terror, whereas the extreme Left tries to influence opinion in its favor, what Mao called "being like a fish in the water." On the Right you use a bomb; on the Left, though it is more risky, a revolver is preferred.

However, in reality things are not quite that simple. In the complex world of terrorism, the Right-Left distinctions are not very meaningful. Each movement will operate where it finds the best conditions. Who would have thought that fascist groups like the Hofmann group in the FRG, Column 88 in the U.K., or the Belgian Rex movement would train in Palestinian camps? Not in just any camp, it is true, but with the Christian Palestinians. Here there are a sociological explanation: European wanting to learn terrorism would rather do so with people who have the same way of life.

Areas of conflict appear to be the only places where terrorists have some opportunity of operating undetected. The European police are able to keep in check most of the training camps. Yet, it is acknowledged that Basques train in Irish camps and vice versa.

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Terrorists and Drop-outs

Close cooperation between police and intelligence services has made it possible to eliminate almost all the major national terrorism organizations. The Basder gang, the Japanese Red Army, and more recently the Red Brigades have disappeared from their countries of origin. What have they become? Very simply, today they constitute the core of what is currently called "international terrorism." For lack of a cause to defend, they put themselves at the service of whomever presents himself. The fact that these drop-outs of various origins find employers is only a reflection of our violent society. There is only a fine distinction among the various terrorisms and journalists often serve as an instrument to convey their own illusions as well as those of their readers.

One dangerous simplification is to see international terrorism as a single and unified movement. The public comes to imagine a kind of orchestra conductor working for an evil world power, and feels threatened by a secret force.

Another objective of terrorism is to force a government to react, preferably in a violent way, so that the people will be literally trapped between two fires. How can we respond, then? The French experts on terrorism are efficient and have three tools: the intelligence services, which contribute 60 percent of the antiterrorist effort; prevention, 38 percent; and field operations 2 percent. Recently, the Berne Club has been meeting more frequently: the intelligence services are in the forefront of the struggle against international terrorism. The "new mercenaries" have been dispersing their arms caches and hideouts more widely throughout the world to escape detection by the national police forces, and only cooperation among the intelligence services can keep them in check. The response must be primarily a matter of policy, thus it is important not to invent "orchestra conductors" or supermen of the Carlos variety. The very delicate task of prevention can only be carried out by protection of the sensitive points, which are particularly numerous in our high technology societies. In the final analysis, the government's action must be effective. The terrorists never take unreasonable risks. The best evidence of this is that less than 13 percent have been killed while carrying out their operations.

It is difficult to predict how international terrorism will evolve. If the number of alienated people continues to increase, then there is a danger that the phenomenon will increase. The struggle against terrorism will undoubtedly be one of the major concerns of this decade.

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FRANCE

ANARCHISTS SAID TO HAVE VARIED TIES WITH TERRORISM

Paris LATITUDE AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 82 pp 23-25

[Article by Michel Borcier: "From the Anarchists' Point of View"]

[Text] "Terrorism is not a philosophy but a means. It is not a peculiarity of anarchists, but the recourse of all persecuted minorities." To an old "anar" like Maurice Joyeux, there is nothing taboo about the subject of terrorism. This Septuagenarian Parisian is to some degree the figurehead of the anarchist galley. He became a member of the Anarchist Union at the age of 17, was imprisoned for evading military service during World War II, and at the same time incited two mutinies. Since his release in 1945, he has led the anarcho-syndicalist minority of the Working Force. Though today running in demonstrations with the police on [his] tail," he continues to be one of the sparkplugs of the movement.

Like all the anarchists, Maurice Joyeux does not disavow anything from his past. He accepts the entire history of the libertarians, and specifically the great terrorist wave of 1890-1900. At that time, in France as abroad, anarchism meant the bomb. More than 500 people were victims of attacks: from Empress Sissi to President Sadi Carnot, from Humbert I of Italy to American President McKinley. The slogan in style at the time was: "Make the bourgeoisie give up its ill-gotten gains," "Wage revolution yourself," and "Propaganda by deeds," in other words by attack. Bonnot and his group made liberal use of it. This marked the triumph of Bakunin's ideas: "The primary element in a solid construction is to first demolish what already exists."

Are the anarchists therefore advocates of violent action? Certainly not, in the first place because of their public image. They believe violent action has harmed them by giving the public a stereotype image of the anarchist as having a dagger in his teeth and a bomb in his bag. The Anarchist Federation criticizes the fact that too often it gets all the blame for the acts of the libertarians, and it tries to disassociate itself from modern terrorism as "blind and stupid."

Neither God nor Master

However, its position remains ambiguous. For one thing, there are as many opinions as there are anarchists, and as many libertarians on the fringe of the organization as there are in it. The attitudes toward terrorism also

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vary: from condemnation to "friendly nonparticipation," and from sympathy to open support. An Anarchist Federation leader was definite: "We do not recognize the Jacobin states or the laws based on injustice and inequality as having any legitimacy. We are not illegalists but alegalists. We are ready to carry out actions which are outside legality: strikes, factory sit-ins, and--why not--armed insurrections." Maurice Joyeux goes further: "An anarchist resorts to terrorism in order to open a breach, as you do in combat. However, terrorism does not have to be spectacular. It need not publicize itself. He cites the example of Pinelli, an anarchist who was arrested in Italy in 1969. After being taken to the police station, he "fell from the window" and was killed. A year later, the two policemen who had interrogated him were shot. No one ever claimed responsibility for the attack. However, according to Maurice Joyeux, the action had a signature: It was the "anars" who carried it out. In his view, that is the main difference between anarchist terrorism and today's terrorism: One must select the target, and not operate at random, putting bombs in a station or a train.

The libertarians do not regard violence as having an exemplary character. They give priority to concrete action through the media, social arena, and daily life. Thus, they are seeking to acquire a better image, while preserving their influence.

How many of them are there today? A thousand or so active members and a degree of influence over some 100,000 people. It is difficult to tally people who are by definition unclassifiable. There are many coexisting tendencies. There are the anarcho-syndicalists, who favor trade union action and reject politics; the Marxist-libertarians who combine socialism and anarchy; and finally all those who regard themselves simply as anarchists. Since "factionalism" is a chronic illness of the libertarians, it is more appropriate to talk about an anarchist sphere of influence rather than an anarchist movement.

Anarchist Sphere of Influence

At its head is a large organization, the Anarchist Federation. Parallel to it survive two small splinter organizations. The rest of the sphere of influence is composed of a multitude of autonomous groups focused around a project or a theme, and various anarcho-syndicalist minorities in the various major unions.

In 1945, the Anarchist Federation became the successor to the Anarchist Union of the between-the-wars period. It has 400 to 600 members, of whom half are in the Paris area, and it is divided into groups (10 to 20 persons) and links (less than 5 people). It is thus present in almost all regions, having a number of strongholds: Paris and its area, Toulouse, Besancon, Strasbourg, and Brest. It carries out antimilitary and antiparliamentary demonstrations, takes initiatives regarding social issues, distributes antinuclear material, campaigns for abstention in presidential elections, and sets the pact for the life of its members. The "anars" also have their own press: LE MONDE LIBERTAIRE, weekly organ of the Anarchist Federation distributed in 30,000 copies, plus a few local publications here and there, GERMINAL in Amiens, LE DRAPEAU NOIR at Besancon, and L'AGITATEUR at Eubenas, in the Cevennes. The They also broadcast over Radio Libertaire.

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The federation has to face one problem which is common to many movements: How to hold onto sympathizers and members? For the Anarchist Federation remains a kind of sieve organization. However, those who have once been anarchists remain receptive to libertarian ideas; this is demonstrated by the money collected during fund drives. The age distribution is another subject of concern. According to one long-time member, "At a recent Anarchist Federation congress it was like being in a nursery. The people were between 18 and 30. The 30-40 age group had completely disappeared. Only a few old people were left." The bulk of the membership is between 25 and 35. They stay an average of about 5 years.

Variations

In the past, the club-like characteristics of the Anarchist Federation prompted some to leave it. A considerable number chose concrete action within trade union organizations. The three major unions--CGT, CFDT, and particularly the Working Force--all have more or less significant anarcho-syndicalist minorities. There is even an exclusively anarchist union, the National Labor Confederation [CNT]. However, the CNT is a very small minority organization, except perhaps in a few towns such as Toulouse and Bordeaux. By tradition, there are anarchists in the examiners' union and national education where they represent the "emancipated school" view. They have favored sectors such as metallurgy, construction, and transport, but there are significant variations by regions and from one period to another.

Other libertarians resistant to militancy, either within the Anarchist Federation or the trade union movement, should be regarded as being in the anarchist sphere of influence. They are "outside"--which was the title of an anarchist journal of the end of the 19th century published by Zo d'Axa--and get together for a project or mobilize around a specific theme. They establish book shops, printing establishments, or restaurants. These enterprises are usually operated on a communal pattern and are self-managed. There are examples at Lyon (La Griffie bookshop), at Strasbourg, where there is influence by the German alternative movement, in Paris (Butte-aux-Cailles community), and also in some rural districts. In Toulouse, the Mecca of French anarchism and birthplace of Direct Action, autonomous groups (in relation to the Anarchist Federation) publish the BASTA and AGORA reviews, which have some readership.

Key Issues

What are the big causes of the libertarians? Antimilitarism, in all its forms, is their battlehorse: conscientious objection (refusal of military service), service evasion (refusal of the civilian service which is the legal substitute), total evasion (refusal to comply with any formality at all). This is a tradition; however, though all are antimilitarist, some are strongly pacifist, while others do not reject violent action. Louis Lecoq is an example of this nonviolent tendency. Through his activity in the "Committee to Support Conscientious Objectors"* and a long hunger strike he succeeded in achieving

*Which included A Breton, A Camus, B Buffet, J Cocteau, J Giono, and Lanza del Vasto.

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adoption on 22 December 1963 of the law granting status to conscientious objectors. All organizations of objectors and evaders have more or less direct relations with the anarchists. An Anarchist Federation representative explained: "They all know that it is the political organization and the bastion on which they can unquestionably depend to defend them and publicize their views."

The ecology movement is also one of their causes. The nuclear opposition movement is the product of a society which has been police-controlled and centralized to excess: the anarchists favor use of the "benign" sources, solar, wind, and others. There is another old theme which is dear to them: federalism, inherited from Proudhon, which brings them close to the regionalist movements. This why they often go to bat on the side of the Bretons, Basques, Alsatians, or Occitans. These ideas and others feature within the overall social concept: self-management, decentralization. This is the measure of anarchist influence.

Today, the libertarians waver between disenchantment and optimism. "In the course of activity, you realize that tracts and posters are not enough." The speaker, a "youth" who had been in the Anarchist Federation for 5 years, was on duty for a district group between 1900 and 2000 hours over chips and Coca Cola. He approved of some forms of terrorism: "Rue Marbeuf was of no interest to me. However, blowing up the drilling equipment on a nuclear plant building site--I am in favor of that." The mood is nevertheless on the side of optimism.

After a year of Socialist government, Maurice Joyeux says: "These people want to do without a revolution and they will not succeed. The Socialists are not changing a regime, they are going along with it. And they will be destroyed with it. After that, come the barbarians. And we are the barbarians."

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[Caption] Anarchist demonstration held in Paris in April 1982

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SPAIN

TERRORISM IN SPAIN

Barcelona EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA in Spanish 1982 pp 101-142

[Chapter from book by Alejandro Munoz Alonso]

[Text] Chapter III The Escalation

"A handful of fanatics is sufficient to make us realize how dreadfully fragile a democratic society can be when democracy is not prepared to defend itself."
Pierre Trudeau, 1970

Summary

The strategy of destabilization.
The "normalization" of terrorism.
Negotiating with ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group].
The provocation of the Armed Forces.
When ETA acts, GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary Group] falls.
ETA: kills more to negotiate better.

The Strategy of Destabilization

On 15 June 1977, the day of the first democratic elections, Spain found itself. Many things remained in the past. The democratic fervor and civic spirit with which Spaniards took to the streets that day to comply with their electoral obligation caused many to think that a new era was beginning wherein violence would no longer have a place in our collective life. Democracy represented precisely the end of "institutionalized violence" which was replaced by the rule of law. Abuse of authority or overstepping in the exercise of authority would no longer be fitting. Henceforth the power would come from the people, would be legitimized among the people and would be justified by the people. It would render an accounting to the people and would be controlled by the people's representatives. In short, the state of law was the antithesis of institutionalized violence.

As we have observed in the previous chapters, during the final years of Francoism and the early years of the transition, the idea of terrorism as a "response" to the violence of those in power had cropped up over and over again. With this kind of violence gone, terrorism no longer had a reason to exist. When

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democratic channels for voicing needs, aspirations or expectations are lacking, terrorism appears as a substitute, or abnormal medium for communication. But when those democratic channels are guaranteed for all groups, implementing the principle of pluralism, the "raison d'etre" of political violence as a mechanism for expression disappears.

As we shall note upon analyzing the polls, this view, a real "wishful thinking," was held by many Spaniards. But, very soon, events occurred, with their sudden reality, to challenge this exalted notion. The terrorism continued with democracy, and even reached higher levels than at any previous time.

During the summer of 1977, ETA maintained the truce, but GRAPO again gave signs of its existence, despite the fact that the organization's most prominent leaders had been arrested. On 11 July, two bombs destroyed the premises of the French cultural delegation in Madrid, wounding three persons. A week later, a GRAPO commando unit kidnapped the radio broadcasting technician Mario Frigenti at the SER facilities on the outskirts of Madrid. They were attempting to transmit a message of a "republican" nature via the SER main broadcasting antennas, but they did not achieve their purpose, and the technician was released.

On the night of 6-7 August, a 19-year old GRAPO member, Luis Torrijos, kept seven hostages from the same family in captivity in a house in Madrid. The mediation by Prof Tierno Galvan put an end to the abduction, and the "GRAPO member" surrendered without putting up any resistance. This Luis Torrijos invaded the house wielding a pistol and shouting: "The police are pursuing me, I am from GRAPO." The phrase was to become notorious as an expression of alleged popular support, which the strange organization never enjoyed.

Two days later, the police announced the capture of another six members of the same terrorist organization, including one of its most prominent leaders, Fernando Hierro Chomon, who was accused of having supplied the explosives used in the attack against DIARIO 16 the previous June. He was also considered to have been implicated in the Oriol and Villaescusa kidnappings. We shall comment later on the circumstances that surrounded these arrests, apparently due to the information supplied by someone who had infiltrated.

But it was not until the end of September that the terrorism, as if emerging from a summertime lethargy, made its bloody presence felt again. On 20 September, a powerful device exploded in the building of the Barcelona magazine, EL PAPUS, killing the doorman of the premises, Juan Penalver, and causing 16 injuries, several of which were serious. Shortly thereafter, the Triple A claimed responsibility for the attack. In the communique, it accused the magazine of having published articles "which left fascism debased."

All the Barcelona news media held a 24-hour strike in solidarity with EL PAPUS and in protest at what was interpreted as an attack on freedom of speech. A heavily attended demonstration even approached the civil government, demanding the arrest of the extreme right wing groups. On Friday, 23 September, the Madrid newspapers also held a much-discussed strike and a journalist demonstration

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paraded through the downtown streets. The Spanish weeklies published a joint editorial entitled "We defend freedom of speech." Like the Catalan press, they also declared that "The attacks (...) have the common goal of obstructing the democratic process which has begun in our country." "The unpunished action of the uncontrolled groups, the existence of parallel organizations and the brazen operation of extreme right wing groups with international connections demand from the authorities not only immediate action, but also a public explanation."

A few days later, on 27 September, the Armed Police captain, Florentino Herguedas Carretero, was assassinated in Madrid. Although the assassination was claimed by several unknown organizations, such as OREA (Revolutionary Organization of Antifascist Spain) and the Party for the Liberation of Spain, it was presumed to have possibly been another action by GRAPO. As on so many other occasions, the extreme right wingers took advantage of the assassinated captain's funeral to shout against the government and demand the "Army in power."

These first attacks after the elections prompted commentators to think that the goal of the terrorists of all stripes was none other than the destabilization of democracy. Terrorism was no longer viewed as an expression of a desire for greater liberty, but rather as a strategy against the nascent democracy. EL PAIS, which gave a reminder that, with Captain Herguedas, the number of members of the forces of public order who had fallen victim to attacks since the death of Franco totaled 19, noted that "Captain Herguedas' death is an assassination, without any other possible explanation than political provocation." (1)

According to CAMBIO 16, "The public has been becoming aware of the fact that there may be clearcut connections between political individuals identified with the most extreme Francoist sectors and the proliferation of right wing commando units, uncontrolled groups and certain special services which have refused to disappear after 40 years of influence and impunity." It continued thusly: "These groups, which may show up with a right or left wing countenance (...) have a plan for political destabilization (...), and have certain accomplices at their disposal in a machinery, that of the administration, which is not yet used to a situation of democratic normality." In the view of CAMBIO 16, it was obvious that "the goal of the right wing groups of the 'ancien regime' and that of the extreme small groups rising sporadically to the surface is the same: to put an end to democracy." (2)

Meanwhile, scarcely any progress had been made in the direction of solving the Basque problem. The ETA members "exiled" in foreign territory who had no permission to enter Spain legally broke the ban: On 22 July, 10 of them were present at a rally held in Durango (Vizcaya). Six days later, in an odd paradox clearly demonstrating the enormous gap separating the legal from the real, the "Official State Bulletin" published the decrees on exile. At that time, those "exiled" had ceased to be such, and although one of them was arrested, the others showed up at another public function, and even went to the graves of the nationalist militants to pay tribute to them. No one doubted the tacit consent of the government.

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During the entire month of August, there was a virtually uninterrupted succession of demonstrations and gatherings in the Basque Country, in solidarity with "Apala," who had been on a hunger strike since 30 July in the Beaumettes (Marseilles) prison. He was protesting his possible turnover to the Spanish Government. Over 300 individuals in the Basque Country started a strike in solidarity with the prominent ETA leader. CAMBIO 16 expressed the view that he was becoming "a Basque national hero." Committees on Behalf of "Apala" were created, and the "March of Liberty" itself, which toured the Basque country that summer, turned almost completely into a march on behalf of "Apala." Hundreds of Basques went to France to visit the jailed ETA member and to demonstrate before the Court of Aix-en-Provence, asking that it not agree to the petition for extradition, the second one made by the Spanish Government within a few weeks. After nearly a month of hunger striking, "Apala" appealed to the Basque people, proclaiming: "If France turns me over to Spain, it will only turn over a corpse." (3)

After 97 days of incarceration and 35 of hunger striking, "Apala" was given a provisional release under court control, without being able to leave the department of Bouches du Rhone until his extradition process was heard on 14 October. Then the French leftist parties voiced opposition to the extradition. Specifically, the Socialists declared: "Our position is the same as that of PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], our fraternal party; in other words, we do not want anything to do with groups seeking to destabilize the Spanish situation, but we shall not consent to the granting of his extradition either." (4) For its part, ETA, temporarily inactive, threatened to renew the "armed action" if the request for extradition succeeded. It did not succeed, but ETA resumed its bloody activity. As for "Apala," he fled to "a safe place" before the trial took place. No further news was heard regarding this prominent ETA member until 1980.

The other two major issues which produced mobilization and the assumption of positions in the Basque Country during the summer of 1977 were the "uncontrolled" and total amnesty. The name "uncontrolled" was given to the groups of unidentified individuals who mingled with the people maintaining a provocative and aggressive attitude, particularly on the occasion of the popular festivals in various Basque localities. The civil governors of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa at the time, Salazar-Simpson and Oyarzabal, respectively, often received complaints, and declared their desire to end that situation. But no "uncontrolled" person was ever arrested or identified. Letamendia, deputy of Euskadiko Eskerra [Basque Left] representing Guipuzcoa, expressed his conviction that "there are police among the uncontrolled" and that, in any event, "they are acting with the backing of the forces of order."

In view of the government's impassiveness, the residents of Amorebieta (Vizcaya) proposed to carry out criminal action, forming self-defense pickets that succeeded in capturing and identifying some of the uncontrolled. From the documents, notes, weapons and even police badges that were found on them, there was no doubt of the official nature of those uncontrolled persons who, moreover, were immediately released upon being turned over to the Civil Guard barracks. (5)

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Almost as much as during the summer of 1976, the amnesty, particularly in the Basque Country, was a mobilizing idea. It was requested that Parliament pass a total amnesty law that would achieve the release of those arrested for political reasons who were still in jail. But the common prisoners also wanted to benefit from the advent of democracy, and so the summer of 1977 was marked by uprisings in the jails which, on occasion, caused nearly total destruction of the prison establishments.

The amnesty was also an occasion for confrontations among various Basque political parties. Specifically, on 8 September, a demonstration was held in San Sebastian which had been called by PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and PSOE to petition for amnesty and which was met with a counter-demonstration by the most radicalized "abertzale" [patriotic] sectors. The "exiles" headed by Telesforo Monzon who participated in the demonstration of the majority parties opted to disappear. That day, there became obvious not only the contradictions existing between the majority parties and those of the "abertzale" left, but also the internal differences among the latter themselves. For example, while the leadership and some militants of EIA [Basque Revolutionary Party] participated in the demonstration, other militants of and sympathizers with this party, angry at the leadership's policy, joined the counter-demonstration. Something similar occurred with the ESB [Basque Socialist Convergence] party. According to Socialist Deputy Mugica, "What happened (...) clearly indicates that there are two paths in the Basque Country: one being that of the various political forces which agree with the belief that the objectives can only be considered through peaceful means; and the other, that of the fanaticized groups which want to destabilize the country against the desire expressed by the Basques in the 15 June elections." (6) According to EL PAIS, "The parties of the 'abertzale' left, defenders of ETA, and proponents of independence, have attempted through maneuvers to downgrade the election results through popular mobilizations which, supposedly, would cancel them (...). The aggravation and irrationality of the agitators who attempted to break up the demonstration prompts them, through the very dialectics of their hallucination, toward positions that are increasingly indistinguishable from the authoritarian, antidemocratic mentality that they are presumably combating." (7)

However, it was obvious that extensive sectors of Basque society still backed ETA in one way or another, although some encouraging signs were beginning to be perceived. CAMBIO 16 wrote: "While in all the mass demonstrations held in the Basque Country recently, thousands upon thousands of people enthusiastically chanted the ETA slogan, 'herria zurekin' (ETA, the people are with you), the majority parties and large sectors of the people no longer appear to be in agreement with some of this organization's methods." (8) According to the magazine, "the protest from the public" was due to the constant series of letters received by Basque industrialists asking for the well-known "revolutionary tax," and to the exploding of premises to be used for a school for small children on 12 September, in Eibar, by the ETA military. ETA (m) claimed that the premises were to be used for the Armed Police station and barracks, but the mayor of Eibar, backed by the residents, released a communique reiterating that it was a school for small children that was involved, and that "any careful observer can ascertain, if he examines the buildings, that they could not serve the purpose that is now being attempted to ascribe to them, owing to their technical features." (9)

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What appeared quite clear was the receptiveness given to the ideas of the "abertzale" left by the Basque youth. Sources close to PCE [Spanish Communist Party] and PSOE, which were suffering personally from this youth deviation toward radical positions, were of the opinion that the "abertzale" parties might well have the support of from 18 to 20 percent of the Basque population. The great division in various nationalist radical parties explained their slight parliamentary influence. One example was the 80,000 daily copies circulated by EGIN, spokesman for the most extreme "abertzale" sector.

Moreover, the economic crisis was causing an increase in unemployment especially among the youth. The youth joblessness was thereby turning into a source for recruiting ETA militants. The organization offered not only a way of life, but also that entire aura of heroism that had made "Apala" the most popular idol in the Basque Country; and, at the same time, the enormous weight of idealism involved in dedication to a struggle for the people and for the future of Euskadi.

At the end of the summer of 1977, after long, detailed negotiations, the merger of the "beretzi" commando units, which had broken off from ETA (p-m) [ETA political and military], with ETA (m), the most radical but also the smallest faction of the terrorist organization, was completed. Affiliated with ETA (m) were some of the best known leaders, such as "Argala," "Peixoto," "Tropa" or "Txomin." The "beretzi" contributed the extremely popular "Apala," no less. (10)

From then on, ETA (p-m) became increasingly dissociated from the ETA (m) proposals, condemning its "armed actions" in a tone that would have been totally unheard-of a few weeks earlier.

Political events became accelerated during the first 10 days of October. On Monday, 27 September, the Congress Spokesmen Board included on the agenda a bill from PSOE backed by the Basque and Catalan nationalists and the entire left, on total amnesty. Conceived in a very broad manner, it entailed the release of the members of GRAPO who had kidnapped Oriol and Villaescusa, and the presumed perpetrators of the Atocha slaughter and, what the Army absolutely vetoed, the reinstatement of the UMD [Military Democratic Union] military. UCD [Democratic Center Union] immediately prepared another bill, and there began difficult negotiations while, in the Basque Country, the Pro-Amnesty promoters were preparing a new week of struggle starting on Tuesday, 4 October. Two days later, on Thursday, 6 October, an agreement was reached which established three dates for the amnesty: total, up until 15 December 1976 (the date of the referendum on the Law for Political Reform); for the crimes the purpose of which was to reestablish democracy or the autonomies, up until 15 June; and 6 October for those same crimes, but with the omission of those involving bloodshed.

But before the Cortes approved the amnesty, on 15 October, several far-reaching events took place.

On 5 October, the extreme right wing terrorism showed up again: A device seriously damaged the premises of the Basque nationalist magazine PUNTO Y HORA DE

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EUSKALHERRIA, published in Pamplona. As in the recent EL PAPUS case, a telephone call claimed the attack for the Triple A, although the anonymous spokesman added: "The matter of the name is the least important, because we could also have claimed it under the name of Spanish-Basque Battalion or Adolf Hitler Sixth Commando Unit." As had been suspected, the extreme right used various labels indiscriminately.

On the morning of Saturday, 8 October, when the head of the Vizcaya Chamber of Deputies, Augusto Unzueta Barrenechea, was preparing to remove the sport clothes for his usual ball game from the trunk of his car in Guernica, he was felled by a machine gun fired by an ETA commando unit which escaped. The two civil guardsmen escorting him, Angel Ribera Navarron and Antonio Hernandez Fernandez-Segura, also died. It had been a year, almost to the day, 4 October 1976, since his predecessor in the position, Juan Maria Araluce, had been killed, also the victim of the ETA's hatred. The ETA truce had ended. The bloodiest period of terrorism was about to begin. In fact, during 1978 and 1979, the assassinations increased in an insane, brutal progression.

The next day, Sunday, 9 October, all the large parliamentary parties signed the document which was to be known as the "Moncloa Pacts", expressing the democratic desire to consolidate the regime of liberties, in the hall of columns at Moncloa Palace.

On that same Sunday, the police of Alicante and Valencia besieged a large group of GRAPO members who were in an apartment. A total of 11 men, two women and a three-year old child fell into the hands of the forces of order. The police had carefully planned the operation several days beforehand, watching the flat where the terrorists who, according to the official report, comprised the GRAPO Executive Committee, were residing. Among those arrested was Francisco Brotons Beneyto, who appeared to be the top-ranking leader, and Juan Martin Luna who, according to the official note, "was in control of the commando units."

According to the reports from GRAPO itself, this blow, the most serious one received by the terrorist organization, was made possible because "a member of the civil guard, "Isaac Fernandez," managed to infiltrate GRAPO through the PCE (r). As everyone knows, both organizations were linked, although GACETA ROJA, the official clandestine organ of PCE (r) did not admit the organic connection between them for a long time. The infiltrated individual, "Fernandez," apparently was the cause of the arrest of the five members of the Regional Committee of PCE (r) of Asturias. Later, he joined the commando unit led by Hierro Chomon. In August 1977, when this commando unit was planning to steal weapons at the Madrid Mobile Depot, all of its members, including Hierro Chomon, were arrested by the police. One member of the commando unit, Luis Torrijos, was captured in the apartment where he had taken refuge, holding the entire family as hostages, as we explained previously. Only "Isaac Fernandez," precisely, escaped, and this put GRAPO on its guard. It captured him, and subjected him to questioning (...). However, after jumping out of a first floor window, "Fernandez" managed to escape. Within a few minutes, the police arrived at the apartment from which everyone except Luis Alvarez, the presumed executor appointed by "Isaac Fernandez," had fled. On 15 September, GRAPO published a perfectly printed sheet

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containing a photograph of "Fernandez" and exposing him as an infiltrated "cop." Months later, when Cubillo was the victim of an attack, it was learned that "Isaac Fernandez'" real name was Jose Luis Espinosa Pardo, and that he had served as liaison for the Algeria-Cubillo-GRAP0 trio. (11)

The arrests by the police did not affect the extreme leftist terrorist organization alone. Following the attack against EL PAPUS, an extensive police operation was put into effect, resulting in the arrest of a large extreme rightist group in Barcelona and Lerida. The most prominent of the 12 persons arrested was Miguel Gomez Benet, chief of the Lerida extreme rightist group, whom we mentioned in the previous chapter. This former national councilman of the Movement and lieutenant in the Franco Guard was the organizer of the training courses for fascists which were given in Lerida Province and which constituted a genuine school of terrorism. Among those captured were some well-known fascists responsible for many attacks, specifically, Juan Jose Bosch Tapies, the presumed material perpetrator of the attack on EL PAPUS. (12)

But no one had any illusions. The terrorists' arrests did not mean the end of terrorism. CAMBIO 16 viewed it in this fashion: "Fascists of the red stripe or fascists of the blue stripe will continue to kill and will continue to attempt to restore the iron rule of oppression in this country. What is probably not imagined is that a cherished and strong democracy will triumph where the dictatorship failed. Now the terrorists can no longer say that they are defending the people's interests, but rather the infamous interests of their particular tyranny. They remain alone, they will continue to kill, but sooner or later the weight of the law will fall upon them." (13)

Once the truce had been broken by ETA, the attacks continued. On 13 October, in Villabona (Guipuzcoa), the truck driver Jose Manuel Garro Azpiroz died; and on 17 October, in Lasarte (Guipuzcoa), it was the civil guard, Ildefonso Sanchez Amil, who was the victim of the ETA terrorism. The attacks began to be insignificant, and the press was devoting increasingly less space and smaller headlines to them. On 2 November, it was the Irun municipal police sergeant, Jose Diez Fernandez, who was shot to death by ETA (m) bullets. As on other occasions, the Basque political parties condemned the attack; as on other occasions, the "abertzale" left groups kept a silence; a silence which seemed to many to be concealing connivance and even complicity. A few days later, on 12 November, the armed police chaplain, Jesus Aurelio Aranguas Gutierrez, and the policemen Francisco Munoz Madrid and Jose Caverio Duso were killed in a multiple attack.

MPAIAC [Sovereignty and Independence Movement of the Canary Islands] also returned to the "armed struggle" to celebrate the 13th anniversary of its founding, as Cubillo announced from its broadcasting station, "The Free Canaries Voice." He also said that "the Guanche [Canary Island] armed forces will begin the armed struggle until final victory or death." A few days earlier, 16 MPAIAC militants had benefited from the amnesty after having remained in jail for a few months. On 15 December, two armed police agents were slightly wounded by shotgun fire from an MPAIAC commando unit.

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There was increasing concern over the terrorist action to destabilize a regime such as the nascent Spanish democracy, which was experiencing a difficult phase marked by the preconstitutional situation. The need to modernize the battle against terrorism was felt, and it was then that there began to be talk of creating special commando units of the German type which had resolved the hijacking of a German airplane in Mogadiscio (Somalia).

In the psychosis over destabilization that was being experienced, it was feared in particular that ETA or GRAPO would attempt an assault upon the king or President Suarez, which would presumably destroy the complex, difficult effort for democratic institutionalization that was being expended. Major alarm was evoked by the fact that a large number of documents, including plans of Moncloa Palace, the president's residence for several months, to which he had moved precisely for security reasons, had been seized from the GRAPO members arrested in early October. The plans contained certain innovations (an elevator connected directly with the official office and his private rooms) that had been completed only a few months earlier. In addition, the discovery of military uniforms and a rifle with a telescopic sight caused the police to conclude that an attack on Suarez was being planned, not the first one detected by the intelligence services. The previous summer, a "gum-2" charge had been discovered in Palma de Mallorca, on the route that the king and the president of the government were scheduled to take a few minutes later. In February 1977, an operation aimed at Suarez' assassination had been detected; and, insofar as the king was concerned, in October 1977 MPAIAC had set two small, merely "testimonial" explosives on the route that Juan Carlos I was to take on his official visit to Las Palmas. The same night, from Algiers, Cubillo proudly proclaimed that "the impressive royal security service is powerless against us." When the king and queen paid an official visit to Belgium, from 16 to 19 October, a threatening call was received from the extreme right organization, Black Order, which necessitated the reinforcement of the security measures.

On the night of 12 November, Moncloa Palace was machine-gunned from a black Chrysler which took the El Pardo highway at full speed. Although Suarez himself confirmed the news, the great distance at which the pistol's empty cartridges were found, about 300 meters from Moncloa Palace, caused importance to be detracted from the incident. On this occasion, the stringent security measures surrounding the president were described. (14)

The atmosphere of violence was beginning to cause concern. Democracy, backed by the vast majority of Spaniards, as proven by the results of the general elections of 15 June, was being harassed by two radicalized types of extremists who did not understand nor want any language other than that of violence. The incitement to a coup coming from the extreme right was associated with the praise for ETA that was heard in the Basque provinces. On 13 December, in Salamanca, the New Force leader, Blas Pinar, a great sower of discord, asserted: "Violence is not at odds with Christian sentiments (and) values such as God and Fatherland must be defending, even with violence."

An attack which evoked particular repudiation was the one which cost the life of Comdr Joaquín Imaz Martínez, chief of the armed police in Pamplona. In

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this way, ETA (m) took the first step in the strategy for provocation of the Army which was to be carried out particularly in the summer of 1978. An ETA militant, David Alvarez, was seriously wounded.

The assassination of commander Imaz was claimed by ETA (m) in a long communique in which it stressed: "We shall continue our military campaign against the police corps which have supported the military dictatorship in Euskadi until they have been totally expelled from our Basque territory." PSOE or, more accurately, the Socialist Party of Euskadi-PSOE, published a manifesto containing what was possibly the harshest condemnation of terrorism to date. The manifesto attacked the Euskadiko Eskerra members of parliament (Deputy Letamendia and Senator Bandres) "who, at the time when Mr Imaz was assassinated, at a political rally held in San Sebastian (...) were chanting from the platform "Gora ETA" and "ETA herria zurekin" (ETA, the people are with you); which appears to mean that EIA and those members of parliament were backing the ETA violent action." The aforementioned members of parliament, Bandres and Letamendia, issued a public retort in which, among other things, they claimed that the shouting of "ETA herria zurekin", when "chanted en masse (...) represents the people's recognition for a glorious national liberation movement that has been carried out during the past 15 years in Euskadi, which transcends the action of partial branches of this organization or concrete action taken by it." (15) DIARIO 16 concluded by saying: "If they confirm their support for the violent action of ETA, their place ought to be outside of the Cortes." (16) In a harsh editorial against ETA, EL PAIS made this statement: "The Basque members of parliament must establish their thinking on the future of their people and the ethical and political opinion that they should now have for an 'armed branch' such as ETA (...). Let the representatives freely elected by the Basque people clearly define their position on the view that they hold of a minority organization which is persecuting the independence of Euskadi (with Navarra or without Navarra? with Rioja or without Rioja? with the French-Basque provinces or without them?), based on politico-historical analyses made with dialectical materials supplied by the Parabellum establishment." (17)

Yet before the year's end, ETA (m) assassinated the Irun councilman Julio Martinez Esquerro (on 17 December). On 20 December, there was an abortive attack on the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant, thereby starting a long campaign that was to last for several years, with Iberduero, the company owning the powerplant, as a target. On 30 December, ETA (p-m) stole 300 kilograms of explosives owned by Riotinto Explosives. Also attributed to ETA (p-m) was the theft of 264 shotguns in Elgoibar, 900 kilograms of "gum-2" in Galdacano and 250 kilograms of hydronite in Gallarta. There was no doubt that ETA (p-m) was also readying to resume the armed struggle. These repeated thefts of explosives brought about the dismissal of the civil guard lieutenant colonel in Vizcaya, and an extensive police operation against ETA was started.

The Basque Country was submerged in the whirlpool of violence. On 10 December, the last Basque inmate left jail; and on 30 December the Basque Country was granted preautonomy. But, as we have already had occasion to note, the political gains and concessions were not only incapable of curbing the terrorist madness, but appeared to act as catalysts for the violence.

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1977 ended in this way. The toll of the terrorists was by now impressive: 21 killed by ETA, 10 by GRAPO and seven by the extreme right; in addition to some 30 countrymen killed in various types of confrontations with the forces of public order, the last two during December in Malaga and Santa Cruz de Tenerife.

The 'Normalization' of Terrorism

The terrorist attacks increased so that in 1978 they became a usual "event." But few weeks did not contribute a death to the tragic terrorist statistics, and if we consider the attacks of lesser dimensions, the tabulation becomes virtually impossible.

The public was beginning to be accustomed to the daily nature of the terrorism, and popular emotion or political tension was heightened only in the case of certain attacks that were particularly significant owing to the status of the persons who were victims or the number thereof. But the typical attack causing the death of a member of the forces of public order went unnoticed and became almost a trivial incident. This is proven by the treatment given those attacks by the news media.

The establishment of the preautonomous regime in the Basque Country raised hopes. Everyone thought that this was the path, but no one shared the optimism of thinking that the terrorism would disappear immediately. And longer deadlines were set for the total eradication of violence. EL PAIS wrote: "It is even likely that the establishment of the Basque preautonomous regime itself may be what will prompt the ETA military to mount some kind of provocation for the purpose of checking the autonomous process, destabilizing the situation in Euskadi and making involution possible in the rest of Spain. Because those activists, who have been definitively converted into common assassins, fear the political encirclement that is gradually tightening around them more than the police encirclement." EL PAIS predicted that when the democratic regime was fully established ("voting at the polls for their mayors, deputies and governors"), "ETA military will disappear from the scene in Euskadi; its remains, if there are any, will be what they already are: a gang of gunmen." (18)

Despite these predictions, on 9 January the armed policemen Tomas Garcia Sanchez and Diego Mosquera Mendez were assassinated in Eibar (Guipuzcoa). At that time, however, the center of gravity of the antiterrorist battle had moved to Navarra, which had become highly sensitized since the death of Comdr Imaz. Some police chiefs from outside of Navarra, such as the Bilbao chief commissioner, Gomez Margarida, "Conesa's right arm," and the general deputy director of security and expert on ETA owing to his long stay in the Basque Country, Jose Sainz, participated in a spectacular deployment. Several arrests of presumed ETA members had taken place early in the year, but the culminating point of the operation took place on 11 January when, during the course of a search of an apparently vacant "safe apartment," when the inspectors were on the street, there was an armed confrontation in which the policeman Jose Manuel Baena Martin and the ETA members Marinao Perez de Vinasper and Ceferino Sarasola Arregui were killed.

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The majority political parties took advantage of the occasion to reiterate the condemnation of the ETA violence, but the "abertzale" left parties, EIA, LAIA [Basque Workers Revolutionary Party], HASI [Revolutionary People's Socialist Party], the LAB [Basque National Union] trade union federation and other groups accused the "repressive corps" whose latest act had been "the assassination of two ETA (m) militants in the San Jorge district on 11 January." Other extraparlimentary groups considered the incident "an inevitable consequence of the police occupation and the systematic campaign of checks, searches, arrests and interrogations which we in Pamplona have suffered since last Saturday and which has culminated in the manhunt and massacre of ETA militants." (19)

The battle against ETA was embarking on a new phase typified by increased activity both by the military and the politico-military branch. The latter had undergone a period of recovery after the blows sustained in recent months, both from the police action and the splitting off by "Apala's" special commando units (bereziak) which, as we already know, had ended up swelling the ranks of the "milis" as the members of ETA (m) were called. There was also talk of a pact with the government as an explanation for the truce.

The differences separating the two branches of ETA became more distinct than ever. ETA (m) gave absolute priority to the armed struggle, attempting to create a prerevolutionary situation and showing up the contradictions in the regime which they considered to be pseudo-democratic. They attempted to approach the people over and above the channels opened by the parties, "so that they will accept our action and break off from the conventional democracy." ETA (m) held the view that, "Our people are beginning to understand that the elections were merely a trap to legitimize as democratic a regime which is essentially a military dictatorship."

ETA (p-m) considered itself a coercive apparatus backing the action of the parties. Armed action is only a supplement to the mass struggle, and hence the action should be selective. In short, only when the mass struggle proves to be incapable of attaining its demands does armed intervention become necessary. ETA (p-m) considered itself a military vanguard of the Basque national and social revolution.

ETA (m) was almost unanimously criticized by all the political leaders, including those like Sabino Arana of the Revolutionary Communist League, or Roberto Lerchundi of the Communist Party, who had been ETA militants at times. Sabino Arana criticized acts such as the deaths of Bereziadi, Ibarra or Imaz, which "seemed motivated more by logistical causes (the possibility of achieving them) than by political ones." According to Lerchundi, "The ETA activity since the death of Franco has shown solely and constantly antidemocratic features (...)." He said: "I claim that ETA is acting against the interests of Euskadi and against the interests of liberty."

In any event, the intention of both branches to continue the struggle prompted almost all the Basque political parties to advocate negotiation. It was claimed that, on other occasions, negotiations had brought results, and the government was attributed the desire to negotiate and the search for qualified spokesmen.

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It was even learned that there was a communique from ETA (m) wherein it set forth a "minimal ceiling" for negotiating with the government, but which, in view of its proposition, made the negotiations impossible. In fact, besides the traditional issues of total amnesty (still) and the "expulsion" of the repressive corps from the Basque Country, it was requested that the Armed Forces garrisoned in the Basque Country become subordinate to the future Basque autonomous government. Under these conditions, it became totally impossible to discuss negotiations. (20)

Moreover, it was obvious that the ETA modus operandi had changed. The civil governor of Navarra, Ignacio Llano, declared: "Previously, (their) names or personal data (of the ETA members) were recorded with the police in one way or another. However, we have now come upon some names unknown to anyone, and some individuals whose relations with ETA were not even suspected from their own friendships or from the persons living with them." (21) They were the "legal commando units" which were very soon to become well known. The members of these commando units never ceased to lead their normal lives. For example, after carrying out an action over a weekend (the number of attacks made on Saturday or Sunday is actually very large), they would return immediately to their usual activity, making it impossible for anyone to suspect their status as ETA militants.

The legalization of EIA, a political party which, as we have already explained, had become an emanation from that branch of the Basque organization, could have been interpreted as a gesture by the government toward ETA (p-m). The more progressive press, in general, received this measure with gratification. "The decision of the Ministry of Interior to legalize EIA, surely the most influential party of the 'abertzale' left, deserves only praise (...)." It subsequently stated: "The minority nature of a political option cannot serve as an argument to keep it outside of the law (...). The independence-oriented principles of the Basque left offer the threefold feature of being impossible to implement, not having the support of its own people and offending the patriotic emotions of many Spaniards (...). But they should not be doomed to illegality on that account (...). On the other hand, what must be demanded of them, and not only in theory but in practice as well, is the renunciation of the use of violence and the explicit commitment to cut their ties with the terrorist organizations." (22) MUNDO DIARIO, also approving the decision, stated: "The only exclusion from legality is caused by the use of violence, armed struggle or physical aggression to make political ideas triumph." (23)

ETA took another step in its campaign against the Lemóniz nuclear powerplant by carrying out an attack which failed again and which cost the life of ETA member David Alvarez de Pena. As in the case of the ETA members killed in Pamplona, there were demonstrations of protest and claims that the killed ETA member had the status of a popular hero. The Business Branch of the Bilbao School of Economic Sciences published a communique stating: "We back the ETA's armed action as the only effective expedient for the acts that have been committed." (24)

But ETA was not the only protagonist in the terrorism during the early weeks of 1978. Two terrorist acts which occurred in Barcelona caused moments of high emotional tension.

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The first one was the burning of the famous premises of the theater-restaurant Scala on 15 January. The fire that was set totally destroyed the establishment and caused the deaths of four workers who were inside. Almost immediately, the police accused the Anarchists and arrested nine persons with that ideology, who were charged with being a commando unit of the "armed branch" or "military" sector of the CNT [National Confederation of Labor]-FAI [Iberian Anarchist Federation] and of the Libertarian Youth. CNT reacted forcefully, considering itself not only dissociated from the attack, but also the victim of a possible provocation. CAMBIO 16 wrote: "The Anarchist federation, which rejects all bureaucracy and maintains only a small administrative system, covered by volunteers who are not subsidized, (...) lacks the discipline and control systems which other federations have." Official circles denied CNT's responsibility in this regard, but in areas of the Confederation the possibility that "poorly trained CNT militants with little political capacity may undertake excessive types of action" was admitted as real. (25)

A few days later, on 25 January, a horrible crime evoked intense emotion. The former mayor of Barcelona, Joaquin Viola, and his wife were mutilated to death after a commando unit consisting of four semi-masked persons, including a woman, violently invaded their residence at dawn and set a bomb on the chest of Mr Viola, a procedure that had already been used, also in Barcelona, to assassinate Mr Bulto, in May of the previous year. The terrorists were still in the house when the device exploded, mutilating the bodies of the Viola couple. The repercussions of this attack were enormous and there was again talk of a destabilization of democracy. At the funeral services for the assassinated couple there were again shouts of "Army in power" and "Martin Villa, assassin," along with incessant hailing of Franco. The extreme right circles stressed the fact that the Bulto assassins had benefited from the amnesty and were already released.

In the controversy over the issue of public order and democracy, the extreme right sectors blamed the new regime directly. EL ALCAZAR asked: "What is going on in Spain? The answer is simple and hardly complex: Francisco Franco died in Spain." And, in the same newspaper, Rafael Garcia Serrano contributed his solution: "The solution (...) is clear, brothers (...), we must dispense with this democracy before it ruins Spain and buries all of us." (26)

EL PAIS appeared to be answering the extreme newspaper when it wrote: "These outcries have undoubtedly aroused among the public the impression that the terrorists are attaining some of their goals: nervousness among the political sectors that are nostalgic for Francoism. The recent decline in public order is a disturbing fact which is related to both common criminality and political terrorism. The countries without public liberties do not suffer from this plague, although terrorism and crime are usually practiced in the cabinet offices and at police stations (...)." It noted thereafter: "It is unquestionably necessary to improve the efficacy of the security services in order to maintain this democratic public order, and the law must fall strictly upon those who violate it." And it concluded by condemning those who were engaged in "making political demagoguery concerning blood which, unfortunately, is now that of all Spaniards." (27)

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This editorial is of interest because it reflects a clearcut change of attitude, not only by the Madrid newspaper, but also in the overall political atmosphere. There is an abandonment of the idea, so greatly circulated before, that with democracy there can be no terrorism, establishing precisely the opposite: It is in "the countries without political liberties" that there is no terrorism, although there is a "state terrorism."

Moving in a realm of similar ideas, MUNDO DIARIO, after criticizing "the anti-democrats (who) have been meticulously preparing the list of violent acts so as later to spit them brazenly in the face of democracy (...), (because) in order to sell order, the need for it must first be created through disorder," concluded: "It is not democracy that fosters violence, but it does quite the contrary: arbitrating peaceful means for settling the natural differences that occur within the entire human society." (28)

But when confronted with this psychosis of violence, the scientists viewed matters more calmly. When questioned by CAMBIO 16, the sociologist Amando de Miguel commented: "I believe that the violence in Spain is very slight. If we compare it with that of other countries, the rates of violence, both political and criminal, are low." Juan Diez Nicolas, director of the Center of Sociological Research, emphasized that, "The increases in violence occur in times of transformation such as the ones that we are experiencing." The psychiatrist Gonzalez Duro noted: "It is not that there is more violence now, but rather that there is a different violence." And all three thought that violence had come to be the price of liberty. (29)

In the realm of what we might term lesser terrorism, we would have to cite several acts by Cubillo's MPAIAC, which was again attempting what he called "armed propaganda." In January, two members of MPAIAC forced a Canaries merchant vessel to divert its course to the Algerian port of Oran. The Algerian authorities did not allow the ship to dock in the port, and the hijackers had to reach shore by swimming. On 1 February, on the occasion of the visit paid to the islands by Lt Gen Gutierrez Mellado, first vice-president of the government, MPAIAC set a device based on "gum-2" in an oil pipeline of the Tenerife Petroleum Refinery.

However, Cubillo had once again lost his main ~~time~~ in Algiers, thanks to the action taken by the PSOE leader, Felipe Gonzalez, who visited Algeria as the guest of the FLN [National Liberation Front] starting on 27 January. Despite everything, Cubillo attempted to obtain for his group the status of a "National Liberation Movement" at the meeting of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] Liberation Committee which took place at Tripoli on 13 February, and at the subsequent ministers' meeting to be held on 20 February. A trip to Libya by the Count of Barcelona, father of the king, was utilized by the latter to convey a personal message to Qadhafi which convinced the latter to accept the Spanish proposition regarding the Canaries.

As had occurred the previous year, the OAU Council of Ministers adopted the proposal of the Liberation Committee which, among other things, asked for the consideration of the Canaries as "non-autonomous territory" and suggested a

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"special assistance" for the MPAIAC, again proposing the sending of a mission to the Canaries. Also, as in 1977, the Spanish Government reiterated "with the greatest firmness its total rejection of proposals, decisions or actions that represent a major distortion of reality and attack the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Spain in an intolerable manner." It was inevitable for Cubillo to consider all this a victory, with sufficient reason, and to comment, with gratification: "From now on we shall act seriously and on a large scale. The armed struggle will proliferate because, within a few days, I shall issue orders to all the commando units to go into immediate action until total liberation is attained." (30)

This "serious and grand scale" action immediately had its first result on 8 March, when an armed policeman, Rafael Valdenebros Sotelo, was killed, the victim of an attack that had occurred a week earlier, when a device set by the MPAIAC at the Bank of Vizcaya, in La Laguna, exploded. Cubillo stated that they did not want the death, and accused the government of being mainly to blame by not yielding to the MPAIAC's claims. "If it continues with this policy, there will continue to be victims on both sides." (31)

Shortly thereafter, the MPAIAC attempted to imitate ETA's idea of the "revolutionary tax," and sent letters to Canaries industrialists demanding sums that ranged from 5 to 25 million pesetas. No recipient paid attention to these letters. There was also the fact that, at this time, the MPAIAC was regarded as dismantled, because no fewer than 24 presumed members of the independence movement had been arrested. (32)

Cubillo's euphoria suffered a harsh blow on 5 April, when the Canaries separatist leader was stabbed at the door of his house in Algiers. (31a) As was to be expected, Cubillo accused the Spanish intelligence services, and PSOE itself, and the Algerian Government attempted to implicate the Spanish Government in the sinister affair. Concretely, two Spaniards, Jose Luis Cortes and Jose Antonio Alfonso Gonzalez, were accused, and were arrested 6 hours after the assault. Links between the accused and FRAP [People's Action Revolutionary Front] and GRAPO also appeared, and also with the Spanish secret services, and hence an unimaginable degree of confusion was reached. We should add that the seriousness of Cubillo's wounds was not known and, as a result, there was even doubt as to the reality of the attack.

The Algerian Government attempted, on the basis of the attack, to implement a campaign against Spain that was to have its culmination at Khartoum, on 2 July, when the OAU Conference of Heads of State convened there.

In May, when the trial against Cubillo's presumed attackers was held, there appeared as a key element instigating the attack another Spaniard, Jose Luis Espinosa Pardo, a typical multiple agent who was not only a friend of Cubillo and Boumedienne himself, but also an individual who, having infiltrated GRAPO, facilitated the discovery by the Spanish police of that terrorist organization's hiding place in Benidorm, as we have already noted. This subject, who had a very long record as a secret agent, had been regarded by the Spanish services as an Algerian agent and as liaison between Algeria and GRAPO who, among other activities, had even been a militant in UGT; something which perhaps

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explains Cubillo's hatred for PSOE. Jose Luis Espinosa, formerly "Isaac Fernandez," was condemned to death for rebellion.

Meanwhile, ETA continued its attacks upon the members of the forces of public order which had, moreover, become the immediate target of all the mobilizations of the "abertzale" left. "Let them go!" and "dissolution of all the repressive corps" were the usual shouts at all the popular gatherings and the slogans which appeared painted on the walls of all localities in the Navarra-Basque Country. At the same time, the relatives of the civil guards and armed police suffered an obvious repudiation which forced them to live in a real "ghetto."

ETA completed this action with systematic, regular assassination. On 27 January, in Bilbao, the civil guard sergeant, Antonio Gomez Garcia, and regular member Francisco Rodriguez Garcia were assassinated. On 18 February, in Villarreal de Urrechua, the victims of fatal attacks were another two civil guardsmen, Antonio Navarro Heras and Manuel Redondo Villegas. On 24 February, in Santurce, it was a municipal policeman, Manuel Lemos Moya, who succumbed to the ETA bullets. On 3 March, in Bilbao, three armed policemen, Julian Romero Sierra, Antonio Villalobos Rubio and Juan Campos Santos were assassinated simultaneously. Two days later, on 5 March, in a macabre escalation of the statistics on fatalities, five armed policemen were assassinated in Vitoria (Miguel Rojo Aguilar, Joaquin Ramos Gomez, Jose Vicente de Val del Dio, Armando Doval Gonzalez and Santiago Canto de los Reyes). On 10 March, in Aduna (Guipuzcoa), the retired civil guard sergeant, Jose Maria Acedo Panizo, was assassinated.

At the same time, ETA was carrying out attacks of other types, such as those perpetrated against offices of Iberduero, a company to which it sent an ultimatum to stop the work at the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant in 15 days or it would blow up the television repeating station in Palencia, which left northern Spain without television. Other devices destroyed a block of housing under construction in Tolosa (Guipuzcoa) and a football pool sales stand in Galdacano (Vizcaya).

As is quite evident, the ETA violence did not only fail to decline, but in fact was on the rise. This was due to a great extent to the fact that the political parties, especially those of the "abertzale" left, had not ended up rejecting terrorism completely. On 30 January, a meeting of the entire Basque left was held in San Sebastian to study a document prepared by PCE, PSOE, CC00 [Workers Commissions] and UGT, wherein an attempt was made to unify views that would contribute to the pacification of Euskadi. The document called upon "those who engage in armed violence to put down their pistols in a unified and collective fashion, and to uphold their political positions through peaceful, democratic means." Several "abertzale" parties left the meeting, and others remained but did not sign, because, while "still in disagreement with ETA's armed struggle, because they consider it a political mistake at this time, yet they refuse to participate in a demand upon ETA to cease its armed struggle." (33)

Continuing its action, ETA (m) which had on 16 March assassinated the former mayor of Galdacano, Esteban Belderrain Madariaga, once more on the following day set a device in the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant the explosion of which

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caused the deaths of two workers, the erector, Alberto Negro Piguera, and the laborer, Andres Guerra Peinado. It was learned that two telephone calls had announced the attack and no attention was paid to them. Confidential sources announced that "CIA was apprised of the attack...(because) hours before the gum-2 that had been set exploded, a call made from the U.S. announced the attack at the Westinghouse firm in Rome, a Lemoniz stockholder." (34)

The attack on Lemoniz was an enormous mistake by ETA, because it evoked widespread repudiation. "From nationalist sectors which had up until then shown discretion toward the actions of the ETA organization to former ETA members now affiliated with EIA, the 'enough' was unanimous." ETA published a communique with some stupid arguments justifying its action and, in a violent tone, attacking everyone, including EIA and Senator Bandres who took advantage of the occasion to give a reminder that "EIA resulted from an ETA congress and now also represents a political branch of that organization." Some thought that, with the stupid communique, "ETA became isolated from 90 percent of the Basque people." (35)

The attack on Lemoniz served EL ALCAZAR in driving home its well-known anti-democratic ideas: "All those who do not dare to confront ETA, wherever they may be, and for whatever reasons, are to blame. Democracy in Spain has failed shamefully against terrorism, not for lack of means, but rather because of too much fear." (36)

But the terrorism was not upsetting the Basque Country alone. Madrid, too, which had not received any terrorist blows for some time, again saw its streets blood-stained. GRAPO became reborn again from its sinister ashes, showing an obvious operational capacity despite the fact that its most prominent leaders were in prison. On 10 March, a commando unit consisting of three persons machine-gunned a couple of armed policemen, assassinating Agent Felix Garcia Alonso and seriously wounding his companion, Manuel Blazquez Blanco. ABC, which devoted its 11 March front page to reporting the incident, claimed: "The mere scant words of condemnation from the political parties are scandalously insufficient. An active commitment to concrete, active, declared belligerency has become urgently needed."

The attack which had the greatest repercussions at this time was the assassination in Madrid, on 22 March, of Jesus Haddad, general director of prison institutions, who had held the post for barely 4 months and had shown signs of being of a reformist bent. A GRAPO commando unit shot him as he was driving in his official car on a Madrid street. The impact grew because, at the same time, it was reported by the Ministry of Interior that GRAPO had prepared a black list of prominent persons whom it intended to eliminate. Some attempted to relate Haddad's assassination to the death, one week before in the Carabanchel jail, of an Anarchist inmate, victim of mistreatment. What was clear was the return of GRAPO to terrorist activities. During April, in Pontevedra, the police succeeded in arresting two members of this terrorist organization who gave clues not only to the Haddad assassins, but also to those responsible for the deaths of Capt Herguedas and the policeman, Felix Garcia Alonso.

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But ETA pursued its insane rate of fatalities until, in May, it reached the horrifying figure of 22 assassinations, almost representing one death per day. But let us specify: On 19 March, in Durango (Vizcaya), Dionisio Medina Ozalla, a waiter, was killed. On 25 March, two armed policemen, Rafael Bermudez Serrano and Rafael Garcia Mayo, were killed in San Sebastian. On 13 April, in Azcoitia (Guipuzcoa), Jose Larranaga Arenas, former chief of the Movement, was killed. On 15 April, in Portugalete (Vizcaya), Jesus Lobo Sato, a municipal policeman, was killed. On 16 April, in San Sebastian, two armed policemen, Percario Onebrajo Cabrera and Manuel Brejana Pequeno, were killed. As we have just remarked, May was one of the most bloody months in the entire history of terrorism. Its 22 deaths were nearly all of members of the forces of public order: armed police (four), civil guard (15), countrymen (three). Among the latter was a woman, Julia Gonzalez Cordoba, who was assassinated in Galdacano (Vizcaya). (36a)

Negotiating with ETA

It was obvious that ETA, especially the military branch, had accelerated the pace of its criminal actions. An editorial in CAMBIO 16 signed by Juan Tomas de Salas commented: "After 15 June, many thought that ETA would continue killing because that was the only thing it knew how to do, and that it would never give up arms because it had found in them a perfect accommodation; and that it would deny the existence of increased liberty in Spain because ETA will only operate like a fish in water when the dictatorship is reinstated here." But there were others who thought that ETA (m), through its action, was attempting to force negotiations. "But is also possible and necessary to demonstrate clearly to the Basque public that peace is impossible. And this will not be demonstrated until all the political efforts have been made on behalf of peace." (37)

Hence, the notion of negotiations appeared again. There were increasing numbers of individuals and groups which were willing to undertake negotiations with ETA to put an end to the insanity of violence. Something similar had already occurred previously but surely never as in May-June 1978 had the outcry been so insistent in favor of some type of contact that would make it possible to harbor some hope for a solution to the Basque problem, which had become a cancer threatening to put an end to Spanish democracy.

As we have already noted previously, the conditions of ETA (m) (the branch in which the idea of the negotiations was concentrated) were known, and the politicians were analyzing them over and over again in a desire to find formulas and mechanisms that would make the contacts viable.

According to Jose Maria (Chiqui) Benegas, secretary general of PSE-PSOE and head of the interior affairs entity of the Basque General Council, "ETA's conditions are negotiable," although he admitted that the point relating to the subordination of the Armed Forces quartered in the Basque Country posed serious difficulties.

One of the politicians least inclined toward the negotiations was the secretary general of the Communist Party of Euskadi, Roberto Lerchundi, who, in addition to considering the conditions imposed by ETA (m) unacceptable, expressed the view (and we must not fail to note that he himself was a former ETA member)

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that, "ETA's long history (...) has proven that while one faction bases itself on the purely political game, others continue with arms." (38)

In the debate on negotiations with ETA, there was intervention by a prominent spokesman: the president of the Catalanian Legislative Assembly, Josep Tarradellas, who offered his services as a mediator. The old politician said: "There is no other alternative left but talking and more talking. Violence does not lead to anything good. Of course I cannot approve of the ETA's methods, but we cannot confine ourselves solely to sporadic condemnations. There must be talk and negotiation." Tarradellas made a trip to France to meet with Leizaola, and did not hesitate to cite Catalonia as an example. Tarradellas also criticized the simultaneous existence of two similar organs: the Basque General Council and the Basque government in exile. According to the Catalanian politician, the first step would be to unite these two entities. Later, there would be discussions with ETA and an attempt made to reach a cease-fire. "I admit that there have been many gestures made on the part of the government to date. There has been amnesty; there has been legalization of the 'abertzale' parties. These are obvious gestures; whereas there has been no curb on the violence on the part of ETA. But, in spite of everything, we must begin to talk. There is no other recourse." Tarradellas then went on to say: "The attempt will most likely be thwarted and it is true, and I admit it, ETA cannot be reintegrated into a pattern of civilized society. In any event, it must be attempted, because it is just like the patient who is dying and is abandoned by the doctors. Something must always be done to save him, to cure him." (39)

All these attempts came to naught. The Basque General Council even published a note accusing Tarradellas of meddling in Basque internal affairs; and the under-secretary of interior, Jesus Sancho Rof, stressed that "there is no dialog possible with ETA," not even by intervening persons, and lent the action taken by Tarradellas a purely personal nature. (40)

Moreover, no one (we have already observed that not even Tarradellas himself) had too much confidence in negotiations with ETA. According to EL PAIS, "Mr Tarradellas' initiative, although by no means counterproductive, does not seem too promising." (41) ABC, also criticizing the note from the Basque General Council, remarked that, "The Tarradellas initiative (...) destroys nothing and made no commitment," and, a few days later, asserted: "There cannot be dialog between those who are attempting (with greater or lesser success) to make the path of Spanish democracy smooth and those who are attempting to subvert a legal situation by dint of machine guns." (42)

EL SOCIALISTA took a poll among politicians of various ideologies (Joaquin Satrustegui, Alfonso Guerra, Telesforo Monzon, Joan Reventos, Carlos Garaicoechea and Jordi Pujol), all of whom viewed the contacts as feasible. Only Roberto Lerchundi, the Basque Communist leader, thought that, "Negotiation is a reward to terrorism and assigns ETA as a representative of the interests of Euskadi. Therefore, our position is opposed to the negotiations." (43)

The street riots and incidents continued, in spite of everything, in this atmosphere of negotiation. May was not only the most death-dealing one in the entire history of terrorism in the Basque Country alone. It was also abundant

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in demonstrations and incidents which quite often used as an excuse the deaths of two ETA members who were gunned down by the civil guard on 11 May in Guernica when they jumped a checkpoint. The two ETA members lived in Durango, and the riots in that locality were especially violent, to the point of even interrupting the period of the Cycling Lap to Spain.

Under these circumstances, the problem of the "uncontrolled" recurred. It was known that these groups were made up of extreme right wingers, but also, as was proven by sufficient evidence, members of the corps of public order. The problem assumed particular virulence in Navarra, where the political parties met with the civil governor, Ignacio del Llano, who admitted his powerlessness against the uncontrolled ones. In Guipuzcoa, nine armed policemen suspected of having cooperated directly or indirectly with the "uncontrolled" were transferred from the Basque Country. But the civil government did not find witnesses who could nor would provide evidence against them.

The extreme right appeared fully determined to stress the practice of provocation. This was unquestionably the nature of the activity that New Force organized in San Sebastian, at the Anoeta pelota court, attended by its national leader, Blas Pinar. There was shooting in the vicinity of the pelota court and the police arrested two militants of the neofascist party.

The hopes placed in the negotiations ended on 28 June with the assassination of the Bilbao journalist Jose Maria Portell, editor of HOJA DEL LUNES, of Bilbao, and editor in chief of LA GACETA DEL NORTE. Portell was precisely someone very familiar with ETA, who was regarded by everyone as a negotiator with ETA. Juan Felix Eriz, a close friend of Portell's and, with him, liaison for the establishment of the talks, claimed that Rodolfo Martin Villa had given Portell extensive authority for negotiating with ETA. On at least two previous occasions: at the time of the Arrasate kidnapping in February 1976, and at the time that the Suarez government granted amnesty in 1977, Portell had negotiated with ETA.

His extensive knowledge of the Basque organization had been shown in the two books of which he was the author, "The Men of ETA" and "Amnesty Obtained." Some of his information obviously came from ETA itself and, on occasion, he had been accused of being a member of ETA, or at least appearing as such.

Apart from other methods for meeting, Portell proposed to make HOJA DE LUNES the platform for the negotiations, giving ETA itself the opportunity to express its own views in its pages. Just 2 days before his assassination, HOJA had published the views of an anonymous group of 42 university members, who considered the negotiations with ETA "impossible to hold."

The death of Portell, who was assassinated shortly before 0900 hours when he was leaving his residence in Portugalete, caused widespread shock. The first impressions attributed the attack to some "crazy" commando unit hostile to the idea of negotiations sponsored by the ETA (m) leadership. But a communique from this organization dispelled any doubt, justifying the crime because Portell was "a specialist in poison." At the same time, it threatened

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"military action," because ETA "lacks the legal capacity for lodging complaints" against CAMBIO 16, DIARIO 16, GACETA DEL NORTE and PENSAMIENTO NAVARRO.

The Basque political parties, UCD, PSOE and PCE, drafted a joint communique which PNV, which was harshly criticized, refused to sign. According to EL PAIS, PNV was becoming a Hamlet, "willing to reject violence in the abstract, but reluctant to assume positions for combating it concretely." (44) CAMBIO 16, in an editorial signed by Juan Tomas de Salas, took a courageous stand against the threat, stating that "We shall retain our position until the final hour," and adding: "Personally, I shall ask you just one question: does the armed struggle always require killing totally unarmed citizens behind the back and by surprise? Even Al Capone, in his battles, sometimes gave his victims many more chances to defend themselves on an equal footing. The mythology of the armed struggle vanishes when the victim is neither willing nor able to defend himself with the weapons of war." Finally, it also criticized PNV for its "resounding paralysis" and for not being "on a par with the historical circumstances that it was destined to experience." (45)

The journalistic status of the victim of this reverberating attack prompted the appearance of a joint editorial in the Spanish weeklies stating that the ETA arguments in its communique went "directly against the principles of freedom of speech," and accused the Basque organization of "fearful political immaturity" and "irrational hatred for democracy and for coexistence." It concluded by saying: "We shall continue not to discredit ETA, but to denounce an organization with a system of values wherein human life does not appear to count at all."

During June, the ETA attacks had not been so overwhelming, although the impact of that on Portell was enormous, (46); but, because of the urgent nature of the matter, despite everything the government adopted a decree-law on exceptional measures which was approved by the Council of Ministers meeting in special session on precisely 28 June, the same day on which Portell was assassinated. This regulation was to be in effect until the Cortes, after the regulatory debate, approved a very similar bill sent to the Congress of Deputies for normal handling. To some, the latter was a more retrogressive text than the decree-law passed in August 1975, while Franco was still living. Essentially, it called for the indefinite extension of holding those suspected of terrorism, with prior permission from the judge. It also called for postal, telegraphic and telephonic intervention carried out by the minister of interior, who would convey it to the judge, "giving grounds for the adoption of the measure."

At the same time, Martin Villa, after traveling to the Federal Republic of Germany, was briefed on the cybernetic methods used there to modernize the state's action against the terrorist threat. But in those uses of computer science, some, particularly the opposition parties, saw a threat to liberties and hence the criticism was not long in appearing.

The violent environment in the Basque Country did not fail to increase as summer arrived and, with it, the popular festivals in cities and towns. The San Fermin festivals that year were especially troubled, their highlight being the unfortunate entry of the armed police at the Pamplona bull ring on the

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afternoon of 8 July. Thereafter, a series of incidents occurred in the Navarra capital which caused one death, that of German Rodriguez Sanz, a militant in the Trotskyite LKI [Revolutionary Communist League], and some 150 injuries. From Pamplona, the incidents moved to San Sebastian, which remained at a standstill and, at one time, isolated from the rest of Spain. Another youth, Jose Ignacio Barandiaran, was killed by the impact from a bullet. Some claimed that it was the police who fired, while others said that he was killed from behind and accused ETA. There was no doubt that the action of the forces of public order had been regrettable, and once again the arrest of the provocators who were responsible was requested. The position of certain sectors of these forces was made clear when, on the same 11 July, a company of the armed police entered Renteria (Guipuzcoa) at a mealtime when the streets were empty of the demonstrators in solidarity with Pamplona and, in an incredible act of vandalism, caused destruction in businesses and other establishments.

At the same time, the so-called "antiterrorist" ~~terrorism~~ returned to the scene. On 2 July in San Juan de Luz, in the French Basque Country, two individuals machine-gunned one of the ETA's historical leaders, Ion Echabe, and his wife, as they were just boarding a car, and the latter was killed in the act. The ETA member was seriously wounded.

In this orgy of bloodshed, ETA also turned against its own people. On 5 July, in Zarauz, Domingo Merino Arevalo was assassinated. As in the case of Echabe, some thought that the extreme right wing might be involved. ETA (m) took credit for the attack, accusing Merino of being a police confidante and of having used the name of ETA to extort Basque businessmen and to enter the "abertzale" organizations.

Three days later, on 8 July, when the Basque chaos caused by the San Fermin events was starting, Javier Jauregui, justice of the peace in the locality and former local councilman of the National Movement, was assassinated in Lemona (Vizcaya).

In the end, it turned out that ETA (m) which had seemed totally isolated a few weeks earlier, was finding in the atmosphere of constant chaos and confusion the medium that it needed to continue its violent activities.

The Provocation of the Armed Forces

Up until 1978, both ETA and GRAPO had aimed their action against the forces of public order. The officials who had been victims of attacks performed duties in these police forces, as in the case of Captain Herguedas and Commander Imaz.

During the second half of 1976, it was noted how those two terrorist organizations were directing their fire against the Army and, particularly, against the highest ranking officers and chiefs. At the beginning of April, CAMBIO 16 published in its section entitled "From a Good Source" a note which read as follows: "Confidential reports in the hands of the police indicate that the ETA terrorist organization might start operating outside of the Basque Country. According to these reports, ETA is planning an offensive that would strike at high-ranking military in the Spanish Army." (47)

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The Spanish secret services even had information to the effect that ETA (m) was starting to store in its arsenals semi-heavy weapons of the bazooka and grenade launcher type. This information gave the impression that the Basque organization might be planning to establish as future targets civil guard "barracks" or other military installations. It was even thought that ETA (m) might attempt the "seizure" of a small locality so as to remain established in it for a short time. By so doing, it might be trying to take the step toward the really military phase of the armed insurrection that could force the government to use the Army. In this way, there would be occasion for ETA to use the slogan "military occupation" which the organization's theoreticians had always considered a mobilizing factor of very extensive scope.

Strangely enough, ETA (m) was not the first to take a step in this direction. On 20 June, an ETA (p-m) commando unit attempted to assault the Military Government of Guipuzcoa in San Sebastian, and even managed to overcome some of the military on guard. The intervention of another officer thwarted the attack which, in any event, was an operation of slight significance possibly intended only to seize weapons.

But in was in Madrid on 21 July that the attack which made the fragile structures of the democratic state tremble. On that day, the Congress of Deputies had just ended the discussion of the Constitution. With the predictable abstention of the PNV deputies, its plenum was to approve the constitutional text arduously achieved during the previous months. At 0830 hours in the morning, when he had just boarded his official car, Brig Gen Juan Manuel Sanchez-Ramos Izquierdo was shot by machine-gun fire. Killed with him was Lt Col-Aide Jose Antonio Perez Rodriguez. The news fell like a bomb on the deputies who were arriving at Congress to approve the Constitution. It was the first time that an Army general fell victim to a terrorist attack. Since Carrero, the terrorism had never aimed so high.

The plenum devoted much of its morning session to the issue of terrorism which had just dealt its latest blow. All the spokesmen for the various parliamentary groups spoke, once again condemning terrorism, and President Suarez himself delivered a speech in which he declared that, "The government will not tolerate extremist reactions by any means; the government will enact the legal measures that are within its reach for the investigation, prosecution and repression of terrorism."

At first, great confusion prevailed regarding which group might be the one responsible for the attack. A strange and unknown group, GAP, and the known but nonetheless strange GRAPO took credit for the attack, but the police suspected that ETA was the perpetrator, as was actually confirmed later. In any event, it was clear that neither the victims selected nor the time chosen was fortuitous. Quite obviously there had been a plan, a plan which sought the destabilization of democracy and, at the same time, was intended to provoke the Army. Suarez himself so stated: "Every time we have undertaken a key phase in our democracy, terrorism has appeared in an attempt to destabilize the country."

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In the view of many, the last resorts in this plan were located beyond our borders, and in this regard there were references to the Soviet KGB. CAMBIO 16 reported that, "A few days ago, Victor Luis, who is regarded as one of the superspies of the Soviet organization and one of its most powerful and influential personages, visited our country." The same magazine added: "Just a few weeks ago, a high-ranking Spanish leader visiting the USSR, upon meeting with a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, could not contain his surprise when he heard from the mouth of the leading Soviet dignitary the comment that 'we would be willing to help you pacify Euskadi provided we received some compensation (...). The main 'compensation' was immediately forthcoming: 'Spain's not joining NATO.'" (48) The Soviet connection was thereby made fully explicit.

Over a year later, in November 1979, when the Soviet foreign minister, Andrey Gromyko, visited Madrid, he made an offer to his Spanish counterpart, Marcelino Oreja, that "if Spain desisted from its plans to join NATO (...), the Soviet Union would be prepared to help combat the most disturbing domestic problem, terrorism. But, according to Spanish officials, Gromyko also hinted that entry into NATO would leave the young Spanish democracy vulnerable to the depredations of terrorism." (49) This rumor, denied on constant occasions by the Soviets, was nevertheless to have factual confirmation in the subsequent evolution of terrorism, as we shall have occasion to prove.

The other issue that was to be brought up by the attack of 21 July was that of the possible connections between ETA and GRAPO; an issue that would never be totally explained but of which rather significant signs were to appear. The Algeria of Boumedienne, Cubillo's protector and, in turn, a friend of GRAPO, might well have been the link between the two terrorist organizations. In this respect, let us note that "Apala's" presence in Algeria had already been detected (50) and that, at the same time, "among high-ranking government sources there was news of the contacts maintained recently between the two organizations: Specifically, at a meeting of the ETA staff in San Juan de Luz consideration was given to the position of organizing jointly with GRAPO a series of actions by both organizations throughout the national territory. However, the American secret services denied this connection when Gutierrez Mellado visited Washington in the summer of 1978." (51)

But perhaps the most important aspect of the attack of 21 July was that of the direct provocation of the Army. Thereafter there would begin an entire series of agreements and concomitant acts and objectives shared by terrorism and coupism, that will be essential to understand the political evolution in Spain during the following years.

In the summer of 1978 coppism had not yet manifested itself, but there were already some very obvious urgings on the part of the extreme right wing newspapers EL ALCAZAR and EL IMPARCIAL, and by the magazine FUERZA NUEVA. With reference to the letter from a military man on active duty published in EL IMPARCIAL, CAMBIO 16 stated: "It is, quite certainly, the best contribution to an entire plan devised by the civilians to take the military out of their barracks and to set up a new regime; a plan put into effect months after the death of Generalissimo Franco which, in some of its points, would receive the

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approval of some military commanders disturbed over the current political situation and concerned over the progressive deterioration of public order in the Basque provinces." (52)

The urging for coupism on the part of the aforementioned media was obvious. On 22 July, EL ALCAZAR, under the headlines "Mourning in the Army, Tension in Spain," published two photographs of the attacks accompanied by a long article which stated, among other things: "Urgent measures no longer suffice; those authorized to do so must take immediate measures." It was obvious that, to EL ALCAZAR, those "authorized" were not governors whom it described as "shallow, irresponsible politicians." In an article published on the same front page, the editor of the organ of the National Confederation of Combatants declared: "It is now time to put things in their places, and for everyone to accept the role that is incumbent on him." And, subsequently, he remarked: "The ills that (Spain) is suffering have only that unequivocal origin: the political inability of ambitious rulers and the old wisdom of the professionals in international subversion."

Despite the fact that it claimed that "the swords are raised high in our political group," FUERZA NUEVA denied its inclination toward coupism. "Spain is at a time of extreme danger, ready to sound the starting signal. The comment made by a newsman in Congress recently, aloud and looking at his watch ('What time does Pavia arrive?') was neither capricious nor humorous (...). And when that time comes (and we would not venture to say whether it will be the best) we do not know, nor have we done anything to foster it in these pages, despite the fact that we have been claimed to have a coupist nature and disposition." (53)

In other publications, the tone was equally harsh, although with very notable ideological variations. In its very severe editorial, ABC stated: "We denounce the fact that the Chamber of Deputies has remained silent for half an hour, hearing the justifications by a representative of the Basque people to the effect that the bombs connected with 'ikurrina,' the elimination of the servants of public order by gunfire and all the monstrosities ranging from kidnapping to shooting in the neck are logical results of the insufficient degree of 'democratization' which should be improved immediately, placing the current assassins in the high-ranking positions of tomorrow's autonomous administration. Neither a murmur nor an angry voice interrupted that series of foolish remarks (...)." It later declared: "Terrorism (...) can succeed only in a state which refused to meet the first of its obligations: that the citizens can continue to live." It also took the opportunity to note that, "It is also obvious that the brutality of the so-called 'uncontrolled elements' cannot be put on the same level as the teams of assassins supplied with machine guns." (54)

At the other extreme of the ideological arc, EGIN, criticizing the Ministry of Interior's decision not to allow the dissemination of the ETA (m) communique claiming the attack in Madrid, wrote: "At this point, it is sufficiently clear that ETA military is not only an armed organization seeking to perpetuate the dialectics of the machine guns. ETA military has stated in various ways what its political alternative for Euskadi at present is, and what the minimal points, on the basis of which arms would be unnecessary are." It concluded

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by saying: "To advocate the opportunity for the armed organizations to be able to explain the motives for their actions is not taking sides with them. It is defending the principle of freedom of speech to its final consequences and opposing the use of censorship as a means of political action." (55)

As might have been imagined, the uneasiness in the Armed Forces was growing. A few days earlier, great shock was caused by the comments made, on the occasion of an official visit to Argentina, by Lt Gen Liniers, then Army Chief of Staff, wherein he cited the "legitimacy of the Argentine enterprise in which the people and the Army have marched together," and referred to the fact that "Spain and Argentina (...) have always marched through history by parallel routes." In statements to LA NACION, Liniers depicted himself as a constitutionalist military man, but it was inevitable that, in the charged Spanish political atmosphere, his speech to Videla should be interpreted as another factor for alarm to a regime which was beginning to find itself beset simultaneously by the blows from terrorism and the current specter of coupism.

When ETA Acts, GRAPO Falls

One of the most repeated coincidences in the history of terrorism in Spain is that when ETA carries out any of its most spectacular strikes, it is not long before the police action arrests a large number of GRAPO members. The situation is present, with the force of evidence, possibly owing to the fact that GRAPO's more defective structure makes it more vulnerable at the times when police activity is intensified. But there is nothing odd about the fact that this strange circumstance has nurtured the doubts of those who suspect that GRAPO is an artificial structure which takes advantage of the perturbation of vaguely revolutionary, alienated elements putting them in the service of a destabilizing operation carefully planned by those who hope to win everything by a provoked involution of democracy in Spain.

Roberto Conesa who, in early 1977, had become renowned as a result of the fortunate outcome of the Oriol and Villaescusa kidnappings, was responsible for conducting the investigations relating to the latest terrorist attacks, the perpetrators of which were undoubtedly associated with ETA. Conesa did not arrest any ETA members, failing in his investigations, as the police cordon deployed for several days starting on 21 July in the vicinity of Madrid and the towns in the Guardarrama mountains had failed. But very few days thereafter, Conesa announced the arrest of seven GRAPO militants, including the members of the commando unit which had assassinated Jesus Haddad, general director of prison institutions. At the same time, police sources who accepted the ETA claim for the attack of 21 July as truthful, admitted that GRAPO "could have cooperated in the assassinations." No sufficient explanation was ever given for this hypothesis.

The arrests of the GRAPO members cited by Conesa had taken place before the 21 July attack, and hence there were some who thought that, "It was obviously a smokescreen to conceal the failure represented by the capture operation." Conesa was criticized by political leaders of various parties, who reproached him for his "excessive" infiltrations into groups like GRAPO which, nevertheless, did not impede their terrorist activity. (56)

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Very soon after the assassination of the two Army chiefs, the Congress passed two very important laws associated with the battle against terrorism. The first was the Antiterrorist Law, the so-called law against armed groups, replacing the decree-law which had been passed a month earlier. The second was the Police Law, whereby the "grays," the armed police so closely linked with the former Franco regime, were to be called national police, also changing their uniform so as to achieve a new image that had nothing to do with the past.

With the connections between ETA and GRAPO unproven, there was no doubt of the coincidences between the two organizations in their plans and also, on occasion, on the time of perpetrating their attacks. On 28 August, when a month had already elapsed without any death, following the double assassination in Madrid, four members of the state security forces, as the former forces of public order were called after the passage of the police law, were killed almost simultaneously in different parts of Spain. In Mondragon, ETA assassinated Aurelio Salgueiro Lopez, a corporal in the intelligence service of the civil guard. Also, in Guipuzcoa, in Irun, ETA killed an intelligence service police inspector, Alfonso Estevas Guilman. That same day, GRAPO killed the civil guardsman Manuel Vazquez Cacharron in Santiago de Compostela, and the armed policeman Luis Antonio Rodriguez Garcia, in Barcelona.

These four simultaneous attacks evoked a violent reaction from the General Police Corps' professional association, which issued a note in which they declared themselves "painfully fed up" and attacked the political parties for their statements protesting against the terrorist attacks, which they considered "hollow" and for the sole purpose of "engaging in politics." The Bilbao police professional association went even further and, after accusing the whole society of being a "silent accomplice," cited the possibility that the police might reach "a limit situation with unforeseeable consequences." In view of this tone, some commentaries, such as the 31 August editorial in INFORMACIONES, mentioned the police "ganging together."

The response from the more unequivocally democratic press was overwhelming. EL PAIS devoted two consecutive editorials to the issue. In the first one, alluding once again to the Conesa case, it wrote: "Nevertheless, it should be made clear that this is not an attempt to turn Mr Conesa into the scapegoat for the failure of the security services to halt the terrorist offensive and discover its leadership centers, its sources of financing and its national and international backers. It is merely the symbol of a certain type of police official poorly adapted to the new situation." It concluded by saying: "We citizens are painfully fed up with seeing the officials affiliated with the state payroll, whose members are being assassinated with impunity, incapable of discovering the assassins and maintaining an atmosphere of insecurity in the streets." (57)

The next day, EL PAIS returned to the issue, criticizing the notes from the aforementioned professional association. It gave a reminder that, "It is an obvious falsehood that the authoritarian regimes are more capable of coping with the terrorist offensive than is a democratic system"; and it went on to say that, "The general police corps should be required to renew its work methods

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and to multiply its efforts to locate and arrest those who are threatening not only the lives of public order officials but also those of the rest of the citizens, thanking it when it has complied with this." (58)

MUNDO DIARIO agreed, stating that, "To stop this state of affairs, it seems to us most important that the police discover and put at the disposal of the justice system those guilty of the criminal actions that have been committed in our country." (59)

CAMBIO 16, in addition to giving an extensive report on the status of the police in which, incidentally, it noted that the association which was the author of the notes "has begun to be manipulated, particularly by leading members of the former sociopolitical brigade, in other words, the Francoist political police," published an editorial signed by Juan Tomas de Salas in the form of a letter to the "Messrs integrist police" wherein, among many other things, it stated: "We citizens of this country are painfully fed up with your intolerable attitude of rebellion against the regime which, for the first time in our recent history, we, an overwhelming majority of Spaniards, have selected." It declared: "The magnanimity of the new regime cannot be taken for weakness"; and concluded by saying: "And if you, Messrs integrist police, do not wish to serve the society of the Spanish people on this new path that we have undertaken, return the weapons that we have given you and return to private life with your dictatorial nostalgia. If you do not wish to defend us, we shall not ask you for an accounting; we only ask you to resign, so that other better police may occupy your positions and better protect your companions and all of us."

In the same issue, the editor of the magazine, Jose Oneto, stressed the matter, writing: "We are sadly disappointed by an increasing ineffectiveness in the battle against terrorism and against common crime (...); recalling that, "In 1977 alone, the investment program awarded to the Ministry of Interior to operate the general police corps, civil guard and armed police amounted to 12 billion pesetas, almost triple the amount in 1976, the last year of Francoism." (60)

This quadruple simultaneous attack committed when vacations were reaching their end caused many to think that "terrorism, too, summers," as EL PAIS headlined its editorial of 29 August. According to the Madrid newspaper, "It would appear as if (...) the terrorists have reached the conclusion that the summer vacations deprived their provocations of the proper reverberation, and decided to suspend their activity until the citizens' return to normality insured a suitable reception for their escalated violence in the sensitivity and fears of the citizenry."

In fact, when the vacation period had ended, the tragic monotony of terrorism returned. On 4 September, in Aguinaga (Guipuzcoa), the taxi driver Amancio Barreiro Geus was assassinated; on 23 September, in Vitoria, it was the turn of the armed policeman Juan Antonio Ferreiro, when he fell into a trap set by telephone, along with his companions; and on 25 September, in San Sebastian, the guardsmen Lorenzo Soto and Jose Zafra were fatally machine-gunned when they had finished making a purchase intended for the civil guard headquarters. On 2 October, forest guard Ramiro Quintero Avila was assassinated in Lizarza (Guipuzcoa).

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ETA (m)'s decision to attack the Army was confirmed on 3 October, when Corvette Capt Francisco de Asis Liesa Morote, second commander of the Navy in Bilbao, was assassinated in his own residence. In the newspaper reports, this attack seemed to be connected with a hypothetical arms smuggling. In fact, a few days earlier, a ship registered in Bilbao, the "Allul," had been stopped by the British police and subsequently released. The vessel was carrying arms bound for Bilbao, but when it reached Spanish jurisdictional waters, the Navy authorities did not find arms or anything suspicious. A file was opened to investigate the matter, and it would appear that Capt Liesa was appointed to draw it up, although this point was never confirmed by the authorities.

On 3 October, when the speculation regarding this affair was occupying extensive news space, Liesa was assassinated by an ETA commando unit which entered his residence and questioned the Navy officer before shooting him in the head, in the presence of his wife and three seamanship students. ETA took credit for the attack in a communique, justifying the act "for his repressive action aimed particularly at preventing ETA from receiving any assistance from abroad by ocean routes." The questions that this incident raised remained unanswered.

Starting then, ETA lent its terrorist action a rapid pace. The cold language of statistics reflects the fact of approximately one assassination every two days. In fact, during October there were thirteen fatalities, mainly civil guardsmen (six) and armed policemen (three). In November, another 13 were assassinated: four civil guardsmen, one of them retired, two armed police corporals, six countrymen and one magistrate from the Supreme Court, Jose Francisco Mateu Canovas, who was assassinated in Madrid on 13 November.

It was the attack upon Mateu that aroused major emotion after the attack upon the military men on 21 July. Mateu had been president of the abolished Court of Public Order, and was considered a harsh man with a definitely Francoist profile. His selection as a target gave the impression that the terrorism, in addition to being directed toward the Army, was intended to attack the magistracy, another great national institution. It was clear that there was a well-defined plan to dismantle the state.

In the strictly political realm, the Basque problem continued to show a definitely negative aspect. All the attempts to have PNV accept the draft Constitution had failed, despite the first additional provision, the so-called "privilege" one, wherein recognition and guarantee "of the historical rights of the privileged territories" were accepted. To the nationalists, this principle had been distorted, because in the third paragraph of this regulation the incorporation of these historical rights was made subject to the Statute of Autonomy, which had to be put to a referendum and ratified by the General Cortes.

EGIN, reflecting the proposals of the radical nationalists, expressed the view that recognition of the historical rights "would be tantamount to the right to self-determination, in this case translated into the return of our independence and sovereignty to a mere personal link with the King of Spain." As is evident, this is no longer a federal concept but, at the most, a loose confederalism that would leave Spain reduced to a structure of the British Commonwealth type wherein a head of state common to two or more states which are fully sovereign and independent in all other respects is maintained only from a purely formal, symbolic standpoint.

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Since this was obviously not the concept called for in the first additional provision, EGIN thought that, "In the end, it is the subordination of reintegration and updating of the privilege to the Spanish legal order, established according to its principles and its unified constitution on a higher scale (...). Thus, the repeal of the laws of 1839 and 1876 does not entail the return of sovereignty, but rather the weaving of a new militarism." EGIN wanted only the first two paragraphs of the first additional provision to be accepted "provided there is a guarantee that there will be no subjection of the Basques to state unitarism (...); because to accept the third paragraph could only be regarded as surrender and subjection to the constitutional text and then it would not make sense to call for its rejection." (61)

In fact, on the issue of the Constitution, PNV ended up aligning itself with the "abertzale" radicals. Possibly to counteract this position which was as extreme as it was immature, PNV called for a demonstration against terrorism on 10 October. In the summons, it did not cite ETA expressly. The document referred to the "new incidents wherein the supreme value of life has been downgraded in a brutal, manner that is incomprehensible from our political standpoint." It asked "our people to proclaim, publicly and collectively, their absolute repudiation of terrorism."

Although, as the president of PNV, Carlos Garaicoechea, wrote, the summons "was not intended to arouse new antagonism or confrontation," (62) reaction from the "abertzale" leftist parties was negative. HASI described it as "betrayal"; EIA called it "improper and untimely." Letamendia claimed that, "PNV had occasion to demonstrate against terrorism when the police entered the bull ring at Pamplona, or at the time of Barandiaran's death in San Sebastian. It could have called for a demonstration then, and it did not do so. Now it is calling one against ETA and, by extension, against the 'abertzale' left." (63)

Some thought that they observed in the PNV initiative an announcement of a Copernican shift in this party's attitude toward terrorism. EL PAIS wrote: "The caution with which PNV has criticized the criminality of ETA to date (...), and certain unfortunate statements from some of its leaders concerning the political profit that this violence could bring them, could not help but arouse the suspicion that the heirs of Sabino Arana and Jose Antonio Aguirre were dedicated to the dangerous game of strengthening their negotiating positions with the threatening argument that peace in the Basque Country would be feasible only if their demands were entirely and completely met." EL PAIS was of the opinion that the calling of the demonstration "has dispelled the evidence on which that suspicion was based as if by magic." (64)

But before the demonstration was held on 28 October, the complex Basque political world underwent many vicissitudes which altered the original positions. The opposing attitude of the "abertzales" forced the ever fluctuating PNV to declare that the demonstration represented "a denunciation of terrorism, of ETA, of the extreme right and of the so-called institutional violence." This latter reference meant that UCD would decide not to back the demonstration, while PSOE hesitated. In another communique, PNV went so far as to offer ETA a reconsideration of its summons, "if the Basque violent groups formally announce the cessation of the violent action." Telesforo Monzon, the old

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nationalist who had evolved toward the most radical "abertzale" positions, wrote in EGIN: "Gentlemen, you promise to reconsider your position if ETA pledges to surrender its arms. But, gentlemen, why do you address ETA, and not the Spanish Government? In your ebbs and flows, according to the prevailing wind, did you not go so far as to say that the demonstration of 28 October was directed mainly against the institutionalized terrorism? So, why do you not address the Spanish institutions, asking them to cease the state terrorism for once and for all, as an essential requisite for your calling off the demonstration? Do you not see that your own contradictions are caught in the web of your own words?" (65)

ETA, for its part, during the days preceding the demonstration, unleashed a campaign of intimidation that was reflected in an increase in the attacks and assassinations. (66) The demonstration was finally held on Saturday, 28 October, with some 35,000 persons participating. An "abertzale" counter-demonstration was harshly repressed by the police, and there were considerable injuries.

On 30 October, along the line of the attacks against news media, a package-bomb exploded at EL PAIS, very seriously wounding three workers, one of whom, a 19-year old youth, Andres Fraguas, died 2 days later. As in so many other instances, the flood of telephone claims to the attack by groups with the well-known initials (Triple A, GRAPO, GAS [Trade Union Action Group]) introduced absolute confusion regarding the origin of the criminal act. GRAPO later denied its perpetration, while the Triple A reiterated it. In fact, there was every indication that the extreme right had been responsible for the attack. The repercussions in the media were enormous, with a series of condemnations by political and trade union leaders who viewed in the incident an intention for destabilization on the very eve of the final voting on the Constitution by the Congress of Deputies and the Senate.

The escalation of terrorism in the Basque Country seriously upset the forces of public order, the prime target of the attacks. The morale of the armed police agents in particular suffered the impact of the situation, and incidents occurred. On 5 October, a demonstration comprised mainly of wives of the policemen went to the Bilbao civil government, shouting "We do not want medals, we want our husbands." On 14 October, with the emotion aroused by the death of two companions, the day before in Bilbao itself, serious incidents took place at the Basauri barracks on the occasion of the funerals. The deputy inspector general of the armed police, Timon de Lara, the general director of security, Mariano Nicolas and the civil governor of Vizcaya, Salazar Simpson, were the object of insults, and were even prevented from leaving the barracks. The incidents ended about 1600 hours, and severe disciplinary measures were immediately adopted. At the same time, over 300 married policemen with a year of service in the Basque Country were transferred out of the Basque Country. It was later learned that, a few days earlier, men and women known for their extreme right wing ideas, had engaged in agitation efforts among the policemen's wives, inciting them against the government and other authorities.

ETA: Kills More to Negotiate Better

The final quarter of 1978 was a key period in the battle against terrorism. Although the PNV politicians stressed that "a Euskadi in peace is not viable

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if there is no progress toward its self-government," (67) there were increasing numbers of those who did not trust that the so-called "political measures" would serve to curb the terrorism. The very history of the transition was proving exactly the contrary, because the maximalism of ETA and of many other "abertzales" did not consider itself satisfied with formulas which, to them, were merely "halfway measures." The rejection of the so-called additional provision for "privilege" which we mentioned previously attested quite clearly to this. Hence, the idea that it was necessary to become used to living with the ETA terrorism became more and more entrenched.

At the same time, reports were reaching the information services subordinate to the government citing the imminence of a major ETA offensive. It was a way of expressing the repudiation by the "abertzales" of the constitutional text that was to be put to a referendum in December. But this tactical objective was quite compatible with the major ETA strategy of the time, which clearly sought to provoke the Army, so as to foster its intervention. It was to be the notorious, feared "Ulsterization."

The ETA (m) staff thought that the involvement of the Armed Forces in the anti-terrorist battle, with the resultant "occupation" of the Basque Country, would automatically improve the position of ETA, "the Basque Armed Forces," as Telesforo Monzon called the terrorist organization, upon benefiting from the status as a de facto belligerent group with all the elements of prestige that such a situation would entail. Moreover, the militarization of the conflict would mean unlimited expansion of the repression which, in turn, would reinforce the ties between ETA and the Basque people. At a time when ETA had already felt popular support weakening on various occasions, this psychological objective assumed a completely priority nature.

It was, therefore, quite consistent that, in the instructions issued by the ETA (m) leadership to the commando units, in addition to the forces of public order, the civil governors, members of the Army and "Hispanists" were cited as targets of the future attacks. In connection with the military elements, they were asked to take into account, "if possible, the higher rank of their members."

On the other hand, ETA appeared ready to eliminate the type of armed action based on small commando units, and to approach the tactic of guerrilla warfare, based on larger units and, as we have already noted, on the use of more sophisticated weapons. (68) In a way, it involved combining the tactics of the urban guerrillas and the rural guerrillas. It did not appear to be coincidental that, a few weeks before, the guiding signals had started appearing unused, something which entailed additional difficulty, except for those familiar with the terrain, such as the ETA members. Imitating the ideas of the Latin American guerrillas, who considered it feasible to "liberate" a given locality or area, as in the case of the Uruguayan "Tupamaros" in 1969, when they occupied the city of Pando, ETA (m) proposed, if the occasion should arise, to occupy some section of the Basque Country symbolically and as an act of propaganda. (69)

But, apart from these military or psychological objectives, ETA (m) proposed a political objective: forcing the government to negotiate. ETA thought that the one speaking to the government should not be it, but rather KAS, the

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Socialist "abertzale" coordinating group, whose "alternative" we already know. Hence, we can note how the issue of negotiations always remained at the top level of attention. And the government itself thought that some type of indirect negotiation might prove beneficial, although at times when terrorism was growing worse, it became very difficult to consider this idea at all useful. In this connection, several months later a report was released to the effect that "Rodolfo Martin Villa, minister of interior, was in Geneva (Switzerland) last summer (in 1978), traveling incognito, to meet with a delegation from ETA politico-military. The meeting did not take place, because Martin Villa did not receive sufficient guarantees that the meeting would be kept secret." (70)

The immediate events confirmed this expansion of ETA (m) activities, reflected in more deaths and an extension of the type of persons selected as victims. On 30 October, ETA shocked its own sympathizers by assassinating Ignacio Olaiz Michelena, a leading Guipuzcoan member of the pro-amnesty negotiating group. His friends first attributed the crime to the extreme right, but an ETA communique dispelled all possible doubt. ETA had decided "to execute him after 4 months of meticulous, hazardous investigation" which resulted in his identification as someone infiltrated by the police, according to the organization.

A few days later, on 2 November, two ordinary laborers were assassinated (Juan Cruz Hurtado, a carpenter in Guernica, and Rafael Reola Landa, a worker in Lezo), whom ETA accused of being "ultrafascists and police confidantes." The same day, a builder, Jose Legasa, was also assassinated for refusing to pay the revolutionary tax. On 9 November, another worker, Luis Candendo Perez, was assassinated in Anzuola (Guipuzcoa). Candendo was a UCD militant. Two years later, the government party was to be one of the priority targets of ETA, especially of the "poli-milis."

The extension of its armed action to different sections of the Basque Country was confirmed. Now it was no longer, as in the case of Carrero Blanco, a totally exceptional action, but rather normal action which unquestionably meant that ETA had an infrastructure and some logistical backup in certain sections of Spain. We have already mentioned the assassination of magistrate Mateu in Madrid, on 15 November, the most important action at this final period of 1978. But signs of ETA's presence in other areas were also beginning to appear. The police estimated that the Basque organization owned safe apartments outside of the Basque Country, in Madrid and Barcelona. The death threats signed by ETA which were received in Andalucia by about 20 persons, including a considerable number of military, gave reason to think that it also had areas in cities such as Granada, Sevilla and Malaga. If ETA was located in Andalucia, it was admitted that there might possibly be some contact with GRAPO, which was apparently well established there. Conesa's trips to Costa del Sol were interpreted in this sense. However, the fact is that the authenticity of these threats could never be proven, although some months later the presence of ETA (p-m) in Andalucia was confirmed when it unleashed a campaign against tourism. (71)

The virulence of the terrorism during this final period of the year, before and after the constitutional referendum held on 6 December, (72) turned the

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phenomenon of violence into a leading element in political life. Stealing the march on the plan of the democratic political parties and trade union federations, New Force and other extreme right groups organized a demonstration "against terrorism and its accomplices" which took place in Madrid on 4 November, with an organization and deployment of a paramilitary nature. With the excuse of terrorism, it was actually an attempt to attack democracy and promote a "no" vote in the constitutional referendum. To the extremists, the "accomplices" of terrorism were, in one way or another, all the democratic politicians. MUNDO DIARIO stated: "This is a despicable attempt to manipulate the antiterrorist sentiments to be monopolized by the extreme right. The presence at the demonstration of people involved in arms trafficking, who had to answer for some unexplained activities to the common courts, at least reveals that they are not repelled by violence (...). The extreme right condemns only the violence of those whom it considers its enemies. Its own it calls holy, or gives it the name of a "crusade." (73)

In opposition to these demonstration organized by the extreme right, on 10 November another one took place, called by the majority trade union federations, CCOO and UGT, and backed by the political parties. During the following days, there was an inevitable argument as to which of the two demonstrations had been most heavily attended. On 10 November, all over Spain, more than 100 demonstrations were held, promoted by the democratic organizations.

On 8 and 9 November, in the parliamentary area, the plenum on public order requested by the Popular Alliance leader, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, took place. For 45 minutes, Fraga delivered a speech replete with statistical data to prove that public order did not exist, because "public order is like health: either one has it or does not have it." Fraga stressed the great disproportion between the figures on those killed by terrorists and the terrorists killed. The Alliance leader emphasized: "Out of a total of 36 deaths in 1977, only four were terrorists; and out of 744 wounded, three were terrorists. In 1978 (9 months), there were 59 deaths and 627 wounded, but only six and one, respectively were terrorists. It is unnecessary to say who seems to be winning." He quoted a commentary from LE FIGARO dated 9 October which stated, in connection with the Spanish statistics that, "They refer to the ranks of the "Boy Scouts," the Italian Red Brigades and the assassins of the Baader gang, and prove that assassination has become a basic political argument in post-Franco Spain." He noted that terrorism is an instrument of revolutionary war, citing the support represented for it by other political acts, "including the permission for illegal congresses, such as that of HASI, which was attended by Deputy Letamendia." Of course, this reference evoked a speech by the Basque deputy who, after explaining, raised his fist and cried: "Gora Euskadi Askatuta!" and submitted his resignation as a deputy. To a large extent, this was a logical decision, after having left EIA and, therefore, Euskadiko Eskerra, a coalition with which he had been elected to join HASI and, through it, the Herri Batasuna [Popular Unity] coalition.

Martin Villa answered Fraga, to prove that the police action against terrorism and common crime was showing good results. According to Martin Villa, "There is no serious public order situation (...); what does exist is a serious problem of terrorism which emerges from the notion of public order as an extraordinary phenomenon." He continued: "But for many years we have suffered terrorism in Spain: it did not appear as a result of any weakness, lack of foresight, inhibition, leniency or omission by the Suarez governments." After discussing the

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various types of terrorism, he stated: "The real problem at present is ETA (...) which shares the features of revolutionary terrorism and independence-oriented terrorism."

All the parliamentary groups participated, expressing opposition to terrorism. The PNV deputy, Jose Angel Cuerda, submitted a plan for the pacification of Euskadi sponsored by his party, and consisting of 15 points, which were a response to the other 15 points contained in Martin Villa's plan. Finally, the Congress passed a declaratory motion in which statements were made condemning violence and claiming its incompatibility with the democratic system. It called upon the government to "adopt all the necessary measures, within the bounds of law, to isolate and eradicate terrorism."

Before ending, November 1978 was to witness several incidents of major significance: the already mentioned assassination of magistrate Mateu, and the breakup of the military plot that was to be known as "Operation Galaxie," the leading members of which were civil guard Lt Col Antonio Tejero and armed police Capt Ricardo Saenz de Inestrillas. Both had had a long career in the history of coupism against democracy, as unfortunate as it was incomprehensible.

At that time, insufficient stress was placed on the close relationship that existed between terrorism and coupism. It was necessary to wait until 23 February 1981 for this connection to appear with all its evidence. However, the still slight perspective given by just a few years has made us realize how the phenomenon of terrorism nurtures coupism. "Operation Galaxie" was possible because terrorism had reached its paroxysmal level. Moreover, one need only read the recent history of Argentina and Uruguay, where the immediate effect of the systematic terrorism of the Montoneros and Tupamaros has been the military coup.

On 15 November, a few days before the abortive "Operation Galaxie," an event occurred in Guipuzcoa which had major repercussions. On that day, the headquarters of the civil guard of Arechavaleta was machine-gunned from a car. The civil guardsmen came out to pursue it, reaching it at Mondragon, where the attackers attempted to flee on foot, and "without carrying weapons," as was emphasized in a note from the interior advisory board of the Basque General Council. The civil guard's account, on the other hand, described an armed confrontation. The two fugitives were killed by the shots from the civil guard. A third person who remained in the car was wounded. Shortly thereafter, other civil guard members arrived, and apparently fired at their own companions, not recognizing them because they were not in uniform. As a result of this shooting, a woman, Mrs Emilia Lassa, who was about 150 meters away, was killed, and three other persons were wounded. The presumed ETA members who were killed were Jose Maria Iturrioz Garmendia and Roberto Aramburu Uribarren.

As a result of these incidents, a protest demonstration was organized. The note from the Basque General Council mentioned previously condemned the action of the civil guard. Alluding to "a public force which fires without thinking," it expressed this opinion: "This act must be judged with great calmness, because it is due to one of these two causes: either an irresponsible lack of reflection, or an even more dangerous attitude: that of a public force acting against a population as an enemy society."

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This note avoked the annoyance of Martin Villa, while the protest demonstration was a cause of further confrontations between the police and the demonstrators.

Five days later, when 30 armed policemen were engaged in sports exercises at the Basauri barracks in Bilbao, they were machine-gunned from the nearby highway by members of ETA stationed at the guardrail. Two armed policemen, Benjamin Sanchez and Jose Benito Sanchez, were killed; and 13 other companions were wounded.

According to EL PAIS, a vicious circle had been established in the Basque Country which was proving difficult to break. "ETA has caught the state and the democratic forces in a difficult dilemma. The desire of the government and the parliamentary groups to achieve a political solution for Euskadi has been met from the terrorist side with a criminal offensive against the security corps, whose members have begun to be shot down in ambushes with impunity (...). The final goal of its (terrorism's) direct rejection of the political solutions is, precisely, to provoke police action that will make the possibility of those tragic accidents implicit" (a reference to the Mondragon incident). (74)

The ETA's action multiplied, as if the terrorists were attempting to take their strategy of provocation to its final consequences. ETA (p-m) opened a new front on 27 November, when it kidnapped the representative of the Ministry of Education and Science of Guipuzcoa, Jose Javier Crespo, who was released 2 days later, to the surprise of many, in Madrid, in a display of maneuvering capacity. It had made an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap the education representatives in the three Basque provinces and Navarra, as the beginning of a "cultural offensive." It involved an attempt to reclaim the Basque people's linguistic and cultural rights, although the police also saw in the operation the goal of intimidating the officials assigned to the Basque Country.

After assassinating a janitor, Alejandro Hernandez Cuesta, in Irun on the last day of November, ETA (m), on the first day of December, in Onate, killed the civil guardsman Manuel Leon Ortega, and at Blast Furnaces of Vizcaya, stole 86 million pesetas in one of the most productive holdups in the entire history of the organization. On the eve of the constitutional referendum (5 December), ETA assassinated two members of the general police corps, Commissioner Jose Maria Serrats Chivite, and Deputy Commissioner Gabriel Alonso Perez-Gil, as well as a municipal policeman, Angel Cruz Salcinea, in a San Sebastián bar. This was its way of saying "no" to the Constitution which was being voted on the next day.

When the referendum was held, there was a large number of abstentions, 32.33 percent, which disturbed the politicians, because it was a sign that the so-called "disenchantment" had penetrated certain sections of the country. Of the 67.66 percent who voted, only 7.9 percent voted "no" to the constitutional text proposed to them. These were by no means alarming figures for the new democratic regime, but the abstention, a third of the voters, was considered very high, and the explanations put forth (mistakes in the census, bad weather on 6 December, and lack of interest because it was thought that the Constitution would be approved anyway) did not prove convincing.

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In the Basque Country, the abstention was greatest (34.48 percent) in the combined three provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, as were the negative votes (23.31 percent). This meant that only 43.31 percent of the Basques approved the Constitution, which was not exactly a good omen. On the other hand, these results could not cause surprise, given the PNV's abstention campaign and the atmosphere of terror created by ETA.

With the Constitution approved, a new phase began in the hazardous political life of Spain, wherein terrorism was to continue occupying a preeminent place. It had often been thought that the goal of the terrorists was to prevent arriving at the Constitution. It was immediately realized that the terrorism was continuing and that its virulence might jeopardize the democracy whose most formidable adversary it was. Despite the menace of "Operation Galaxie," the involuntary coupism had not yet shown its claws. But the terrorism, no less potentially involuntary, appeared determined to destroy the efforts to consolidate a regime of liberties.

FOOTNOTES

1. EL PAIS, 28 September 1977, editorial: "Destabilization Plan."
2. CAMBIO 16, No 304, 9 October 1977, "The Assassins Go Free," p 10.
3. CAMBIO 16, No 300, 11 September 1977, "Hunger for a Hero," pp 13 ff.
4. CAMBIO 16, No 302, 25 September 1977, "'Apala': End of the Hard Times", p 34.
5. CAMBIO 16, No 298, 28 August 1977, "Uncontrolled Commando Units: the Ban Is Lifted," pp 24 and 25.
6. CAMBIO 16, No 303, 2 October 1977, "Euskadi: the Dialectics of the Coup," pp 27 ff; EL PAIS, 10 September 1977, p 12.
7. EL PAIS, 11 September 1977, editorial: "The Isolation of the Basque Extremists."
8. CAMBIO 16, No 303, 2 October 1977, "ETA: the Discord Grows," p 29.
9. Ibidem.
10. CAMBIO 16, No 307, 30 October 1977, "The Basques of the IRAs," pp 10 ff.
11. CAMBIO 16, No 307, 30 October 1977, "GRAPO: the Enemy Is Within," pp 46 and 47. Espinosa's adventurous history was described by himself in a long interview granted to Jose Diaz Herrera. See CAMBIO 16, No 532, 8 February 1982, "Adventures of an Infiltrated Person," pp 20 ff, and No 533, 15 February 1982, "I Announced Carrero's Death," pp 36 ff.
12. CAMBIO 16, No 306, 23 October 1977, "Ultraright: the Gang in Disgrace," pp 38 and 39.

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13. CAMBIO 16, No 306, 23 October 1977, editorial: "This Works," p 3.
14. CAMBIO 16, No 308, 6 November 1977, "GRAPO Final Operation: Attack Against Suarez," p 19, and No 312, 4 November 1977, "This Is How Suarez Is Protected," pp 37 and 38.
15. DEIA, 29 November 1977, p 4.
16. DIARIO 16, 28 November 1977, editorial: "Unworthy Parliamentarians?," p 4.
17. EL PAIS, 29 November 1977, editorial: "A Necessary Assumption of a Position," p 8.
18. EL PAIS, 4 January 1978, editorial: "Peace at the Doors of Euskadi," p 6.
19. EL PAIS, 13 January 1978, p 13.
20. CAMBIO 16, No 319, 22 January 1978, "ETA: the Dynamite In Its Hands," pp 17 ff, and EL PAIS, 2 February 1978, editorial: "Ultimatum of Peace," p 6.
21. EL PAIS, 13 January 1978, p 13.
22. EL PAIS, 20 January 1978, editorial: "The Legalization of Basque Separatism," p 6.
23. MUNDO DIARIO, 20 January 1978, editorial: "Magnanimity of Democracy," p 3.
24. CAMBIO 16, No 321, 29 January 1978, "Ez [left?] in Lemoniz," pp 28 and 29.
25. CAMBIO 16, No 321, 29 January 1978, "The Murky Scala Case," p 24.
26. EL ALCAZAR, 26 January 1978.
27. EL PAIS, 26 January 1978, editorial: "Crimes and Public Order," p 6.
28. MUNDO DIARIO, 26 January 1978, editorial: "Whom Does Crime Benefit?," p 3.
29. CAMBIO 16, No 322, 5 February 1978, "The Price of Liberty," p 18.
30. CAMBIO 16, No 322, 5 February 1978, "To Win North Africa," p 19; No 323, 12 February 1978, "MPAIAC: the Canary Was Silent," p 26; No 326, 5 March 1978, "Africa Wants the Canaries: the Moors Are Coming!," pp 22 ff; No 327, 12 March 1978, "Canaries Adrift," pp 30 and 31.
31. DIARIO 16, 9 March 1978, p 15.
- 31a. CAMBIO 16, No 333, 23 April 1978, "Once Upon a Time There Was an Attack," pp 34 ff; also see No 334, 30 April 1978, "Spain-Algeria: an Eye For an Eye," pp 24 and 25; No 337, 21 May 1978, "Cubillo 'Affaire': The Man Who Paid Boumedienne," p 34.
32. ABC, 19 April 1978.

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33. EL PAIS, 31 January 1978, p 16, and 2 February 1978, p 7.
34. CAMBIO 16, No 331, 9 April 1978, "From a Good Source," p 9.
35. CAMBIO 16, No 331, 9 April 1978, "ETA, You Have Gone Too Far," pp 37 and 38.
36. EL ALCAZAR, 22 March 1978, "They Are All to Blame," p 4.
- 36a. The individual list of the dead is as follows:
- Raul Vesga Alonso, armed policeman, 07-05-78, Vitoria (Alava)
 - Antonio Perez Sojo, armed policeman, 07-06-78, Vitoria (Alava)
 - Carlos Gutierrez Gonzalez, armed policeman, 07-05-78, Vitoria (Alava)
 - Francisco Gonzalez Jimenez, armed policeman, 07-05-78, Vitoria (Alava)
 - Manuel Lopez Gonzalez, civil guardsman, 09-05-78, Pamplona (Navarra)
 - Juan Diaz Resano, civil guardsman, 09-05-78, Pamplona (Navarra)
 - Francisco Lopez Gonzalez, civil guardsman, 09-05-78, Pamplona (Navarra)
 - Agustin Hernandez Martin, civil guardsman, 09-05-78, Pamplona (Navarra)
 - Juan Marcos Gonzalez, civil guardsman, 09-05-78, S. Sebastian (Guipuzcoa)
 - Manuel Inigo Blanco, civil guardsman, 09-05-78, S. Sebastian (Guipuzcoa)
 - Juan Jimenez Bermudez, civil guardsman, 09-06-78, S. Sebastian (Guipuzcoa)
 - Jose Amado Juan, civil guardsman, 09-05-78, S. Sebastian (Guipuzcoa)
 - Jose Barroso Cabrera, civil guardsman, 12-05-78, S. Sebastian (Guipuzcoa)
 - Manuel Veiga Lopez, civil guardsman, 13-05-78, Galdacano (Vizcaya)
 - Francisco Lopez Ruiz-Sanchez, civil guardsman, 13-05-78, Galdacano (Vizcaya)
 - Julia Gonzalez Cordoba, their worker, 13-05-78, Galdacano (Vizcaya)
 - Juan Echevarri Echevarri, second lieutenant, civil guard, 17-05-78, Pamplona
 - Alfredo Aristondo Trincado, member of Franco guard, 18-05-78, Pasajes de S. Juan
 - Jose Maria Merquelanz Sarriegui, taxi driver, 23-05-78, Irun (Guipuzcoa)
 - Rafael Campanario Rivero, civil guardsman, 28-05-78, Tolosa (Guipuzcoa)
 - Francisco Jimenez Pacheco, civil guardsman, 28-05-78, Tolosa (Guipuzcoa)
 - Jose Sanz de la Fuente-Gomez, civil guardsman, 28-05-78, Tolosa (Guipuzcoa)
37. CAMBIO 16, No 338, 28 May 1978, editorial: "PNV Does Not Have the Floor," p 21.
38. CAMBIO 16, No 344, 9 July 1978, "ETA: Deaths, Deaths, Deaths...", pp 41 ff.
39. CAMBIO 16, No 338, 28 May 1978, "Jose Maria Benegas: the ETA Conditions Are Negotiable," pp 27 and 28; and "Tarradellas: There Is No Recourse Other Than to Negotiate with ETA," pp 31 and 32.
40. CAMBIO 16, No 339, 4 June 1978, "Jesus Sancho Rof, on ETA: Tarradellas Is Negotiating on His Own."
41. EL PAIS, 17 May 1978, editorial: "The Basque Labyrinth," p 6.
42. ABC, 19 May 1978, editorial: "Underlying Negotiations and Commitments With ETA," p 2, and 1 June 1978, editorial: "Impossible Dialog," p 2; ABC stressed that line, 8 June, "In Exchange for Nothing," and 24 June, "Negotiate, For What?"

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43. EL SOCIALISTA, 28 May 1978, "The Madrid Government Should Negotiate With ETA," p 4.
44. EL PAIS, 29 June 1978, editorial: "Dying in Euskadi," p 8.
45. CAMBIO 16, No 344, 9 July 1978, editorial: "Why Do They Want to Kill Us?," p 11; see also article cited in note 38.
46. The others killed by ETA in June 1978 were: 3 June, Eusebio Sanchez Sanchez, civil guardsman from Baracaldo; 21 June, Antonio Garcia Caballero, municipal policeman in Tolosa; 27 June, Francisco Martin Gonzalez, armed police sergeant, and Jose Luis Gutierrez Diaz, a policeman from the same corps in San Sebastian.
47. CAMBIO 16, No 330, 2 April 1978, "From a Good Source," p 5.
48. CAMBIO 16, No 347, 30 July 1978, "Conspiracy," pp 14 and 15.
49. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 12 May 1981, "Calvo Sotelo Sees Kremlin's Imprint on Spanish Basque Terrorist Group," by James M. Markham (New York Times Service).
50. CAMBIO 16.
51. See CAMBIO 16, No and article cited in note 48, and No 349, 13 August 1978, "Two Fronts Against Terrorism," p 19.
52. CAMBIO 16, No 347, 30 July 1978, "Unrest," pp 16 ff.
53. FUERZA NUEVA, 22 July 1978, editorial: "The Swords Held High," p 5.
54. ABC, 22 July 1978, editorial, "Dying in Madrid," p 2
55. EGIN, 4 August 1978, p 13.
56. CAMBIO 16, No 348, 6 August 1978, "Terrorism: Conesa Returns to the Breach," pp 18 and 19.
57. EL PAIS, 30 August 1978, editorial: "The Responsibility of the Police," p 6.
58. EL PAIS, 31 August 1978, editorial, "Between Folly and Threat," p 6.
59. MUNDO DIARIO, 31 August 1978, editorial: "The Responsibility of Each," p 3.
60. CAMBIO 16, No 353, 10 September 1978, editorial: "Messrs Integrist Police," by Juan Tomas de Salas, p 11; and "Sadly Disappointed," by Jose Oneto, p 13; "The Police Are Not Operating," pp 14 ff.
61. EGIN, 30 September 1978, editorial: "The Additional Provision," p 15.

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62. DEIA, 12 October 1978, "The Meaning of an Appeal," by Carlos Garaicoechea.
63. EGIN, 12 October 1978, "Different Reactions to the PNV Proposal."
64. EL PAIS, 12 October 1978, editorial: "The Demons of the Polemic," p 8.
65. EGIN, 26 October 1978, "How Horrible!," by Telesforo Monzon.
66. This is the list of those killed by ETA in October 1978:
- Ramiro Quintero Avila, forest guardsman, 02-10-78, Lizarza (Guipuzcoa)
 - Francisco de A. Liesa Morote, corvette captain, naval commander of the Bilbao Command, 03-10-78, Bilbao
 - Anselmo Vidal Duran, first corporal of the civil guard, 09-10-78, Elgoibar (Guipuzcoa)
 - Angel Pacheco Pala, civil guardsman, 10-10-78, Marquina (Guipuzcoa)
 - Ramon Muino Fernandez, armed policeman, 13-10-78, Bilbao
 - Elias Garcia Gonzalez, armed policeman, 13-10-78, Bilbao
 - Alberto Villena Castillo, civil guardsman, coast guard specialist, 14-10-78, Lequeito (Vizcaya)
 - Luciano Mata Corral, civil guard sergeant, 22-10-78, Las Arenas, Guecho (Bilbao)
 - Luis Gancedo Ruiz, civil guardsman, 22-10-78, Guecho (Bilbao)
 - Jose Benito Diaz Garcia, armed policeman, 25-10-78, Bilbao
 - Epifanio Vidal Vazquez, laborer, 25-10-78, Durango (Vizcaya)
 - Andres Silveiro Martin, civil guardsman, 25-10-78, Basauri (Vizcaya)
 - Ignacio Olaiz Michelena, driver, 30-10-78, Andoain (Guipuzcoa)
67. EL PAIS, 28 October 1978, Statements of the PNV President, Carlos Garaicoechea, p 14.
68. CAMBIO 16 published the following item "from a good source" in No 365 (2 December 1978), p 7: "The Basque armed organization ETA has begun an escalation to arm itself to the teeth. Recently, mortars and weaponry with greater offensive capacity must be added to its traditional pistols and machine guns. High-ranking civil guard chiefs fear that the mortars may be used to bomb headquarters in the Basque Country, which would cause situations of incalculable seriousness."
69. CAMBIO 16, No 360, 29 October 1978, "This Is How ETA Will Act," pp 27 ff.
70. CAMBIO 16, 18 March 1979, "From a Good Source," p 5.
71. CAMBIO 16, No 361, 5 November 1978, "How ETA Is Financed," pp 22 ff, and No 363, "CIA Against ETA," pp 25 and 26.
72. This is the list of those assassinated by ETA during the months of November and December, totaling 27:
- Jose Legasa, builder, 02-11-78, Irun
 - Juan Cruz Hurtado, carpenter, 02-11-78, Guernica (Vizcaya)

Rafael Lecaola Landa, laborer, 02-11-78, Lezo (Guipuzcoa)
Mariano Criado Ramajo, civil guardsman, 06-11-78, Tolosa (Guipuzcoa)
Luis Candendo Perez, iron and steel worker, 09-11-78, Anzuela (Guipuzcoa)
Jose Rodriguez de Lama, civil guardsman, 11-11-78, Villarreal de Urrechua (Guipuzcoa)
Leoncio Revilla Alonso, civil guardsman, 11-11-78, Villarreal de Urrechua (Guipuzcoa)
Emilia Larrea, 15-11-78, Mondragon (Guipuzcoa)
Jose Francisco Mateu Canoves, magistrate, 16-11-78, Madrid
Jose Benito Sanchez Sanchez, armed police corporal, 20-11-78, Basauri (Vizcaya)
Benjamin Sancho Mejido, armed police corporal, 20-11-78 Basauri (Vizcaya)
Elias Elexpe, taxi driver, 25-11-78, Amorebieta (Vizcaya)
Heliodoro Arriaga Ziaurri, retired civil guardsman, 27-11-78, Villabona (Guipuzcoa)
Alejandro Hernandez Cuesta, janitor, 30-11-78, Irun
Manuel Leon Ortega, civil guardsman, 01-12-78, Onate (Guipuzcoa)
Jose Maria Serrais Chivite, chief of the Renteria police station, 05-12-78, San Sebastian
Gabriel Alonso Perez Gil, deputy commissioner of the general police corps, 05-12-78, San Sebastian
Angel Cruz Salcines, municipal policeman, 05-12-78, San Sebastian
Vicente Rubio Ereno, retired military man, 09-12-78, Santurce (Vizcaya)
Saturnino Sola Argaiz, industrialist, 13-12-78, Vitoria
Juan Jimenez Gomez, municipal police chief, 13-12-78, Pasajes (Guipuzcoa)
Diego Fernandez Montes, retired infantry colonel, 17-12-78, San Sebastian
Joaquin Maria Azaola Martinez, alias "Jokin," draftsman, 19-12-78, Guecho Vizcaya
Pedro Garrido Caro, merchant, 23-12-78, San Sebastian
Jose Maria Arrizabalaga Artocha, chief of the Traditionalist Youth, 27-12-78, Ondarroa (Vizcaya)
Elisardo Lampil Belmonte, taxi driver, 30-12-78, Yurre (Vizcaya)
Jose Luis Vicente Canton, pensioner, 31-12-78, Llodio (Alava)

73. MUNDO DIARIO, 7 November 1978, editorial: "The Challenge of the Extreme Right," p 3.

74. EL PAIS, 17 November 1978, editorial: "Basque Country: the Vicious Circle," p 8.

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